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Abstract 
Information and communication technology (ICT) has made remarkable impact on the society, especially on 
companies and organizations. The use of computers, databases, servers, and other technologies has made an 
evolution on the way of storing, processing, and transferring data. However, companies access and share their 
data on internet or intranet, thus there is a critical need to protect this data from destructive forces and from the 
unwanted actions of unauthorized users. This thesis groups a set of solutions proposed, from a company point of 
view, to reach the goal of “Managing data protection”. The work presented in this thesis represents a set of security 
solutions, which focuses on the management of data protection taking into account both the organizational and 
technological side. The work achieved can be divided into set of goals that are obtained particularly from the 
needs of the research community. This thesis handles the issue of managing data protection in a systematic way, 
through proposing a Data protection management approach, aiming to protect the data from both the 
organizational and the technological side, which was inspired by the ISO 27001 requirements. An Information 
Security Management System (ISMS) is then presented implementing this approach, an ISMS consists of the 
policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organization, 
in the pursuit of protecting its information assets. An ISMS is a systematic approach for establishing, 
implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an organization’s information 
security to achieve business objectives, The goal of ISMS is to minimize risk and ensure continuity by pro-actively 
limiting the impact of a security breach. To be well-prepared to the potential threats that could occur to an 
organization, it is important to adopt an ISMS that helps in managing the data protection process, and in saving 
time and effort, minimizes cost of any loss. After that, a comprehensive framework is designed for the security 
risk management of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), this framework represents the strategy used to manage the 
security risk management, and it falls inside the ISMS as a security strategy. Traditional IT risk assessment 
methods can do the job (security risk management for a CPS); however, and because of the characteristics of a 
CPS, it is more efficient to adopt a solution that is wider than a method that addresses the type, functionalities and 
complexity of a CPS. Therefore, there is a critical need to follow a solution that breaks the restriction to a 
traditional risk assessment method, and so a high-level framework is proposed, it encompasses wider set of 
procedures and gives a great attention to the cybersecurity of these systems, which consequently leads to the safety 
of the physical world. In addition, inside the ISMS, another part of the work takes place, suggesting the guidelines 
to select an applicable Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) solution. It also proposes an approach 
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that aims to support companies seeking to adopt SIEM systems into their environments, suggesting suitable 
answers to preferred requirements that are believed to be valuable prerequisites a SIEM system should have; and 
to suggest criteria to judge SIEM systems using an evaluation process composed of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. This approach, unlike others, is customer driven which means that customer needs are taken into account 
when following the whole approach, specifically when defining the requirements and then evaluating the 
suppliers’ solutions. At the end, a research activity was carried out aiming classify web attacks on the network 
level, since any information about the attackers might be helpful and worth a lot to the cyber security analysts. 
And so, using network statistical fingerprints and machine learning techniques, a two-layers classification system 
is designed to detect the type of the web attack and the type of software used by the attackers.  
 
Keywords: Risk Management, cybersecurity, Information Security Management System, data protection, cyber 
physical systems, Security Information and Event Management, Intrusion detection, web attacks, Machine 
learning. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Context and motivation 
Nowadays, with the growing usage of technology, computers and internet technologies become 
an essential part in all fields of our daily life. Computer systems are used in all fields, at schools, 
universities, hospitals, banks, governmental offices, etc. We cannot imagine the daily business 
operations around the world without the use of computer technologies. This technology 
controls a huge portion of the business process in any organization, and helps in speeding it 
up. The use of computers, storage, networking and other devices to create, store and exchange 
all forms of data has increased significantly in the last years. Interconnectivity and data 
generated by devices resulted in ‘an unprecedented improvement in the quality of life [1]. 
According to the Internet Domain Survey by ISC (Internet Systems Consortium) that attempts 
to discover every host on the Internet by doing a complete search of the allocated address space 
and following links to domain names, there are at least 1 billion host. The most recent 
survey available online is dated January 2019 [2]. 
Vinton Cerf, one of the "founding fathers of the internet", has announced that IPv4, or 
numerical addresses that allow the web to exist, are finishing. He said, “It is my entire fault, 
when we thought about the IP address system we thought of an experiment, and we believed 
that 4.3 billion addresses for an experiment would suffice”.  Now, we just have to "migrate" to 
the new IPv6 protocol in a hurry, as are already doing ICANN (Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers) and various sites with significant traffic volumes, such as 
Facebook and Google. 
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Moreover, our daily life is becoming increasingly dependent on computers and networking 
technologies. Banking, shopping, and all manner of essential services are now available online. 
This deep dependence on the services available on computer networks underscores the need 
for providing security and reliable operation on these networks. Additionally, in  recent years 
the number of attacks on computer networks has dramatically increased which consequently 
makes the security of computer networks even more important. 
Cybercriminal activity is one of the biggest challenges that humanity is facing nowadays. 
According to the Official Annual Cybercrime Report by Cybersecurity Ventures, sponsored by 
Herjavec Group published in 2019, cybercrime is the greatest threat to every company in the 
world. Cybercrime will cost the world in excess of $6 trillion annually by 2021, up from $3 
trillion in 2015; Cybersecurity Ventures predicted. For organizations, the costs associated with 
cybercrime are vast, they include damage of data, stolen money, lost productivity, theft of 
intellectual property, theft of personal and financial data, post-attack disruption to the normal 
course of business, reputational harm, and much more [3]. 
Figure 1. Number of hosts advertised in the DNS by July 2018 
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Cyberattacks are crimes that are growing in a fast manner all over the world, and they are 
increasing in size, sophistication and cost.  The Yahoo hack — which is considered one of the 
largest ever — affected 3 billion user accounts, and the Equifax breach in 2017 — with 145.5 
million customers affected — exceeded the largest publicly disclosed hacks ever reported up 
until that time. These major hacks alongside the WannaCry and NotPetya cyberattacks, which 
occurred in 2017 are getting larger in scale and more complex than previous attack. Cybercrime 
is creating unprecedented damage to both private and public enterprises, and driving up IT 
security spending. 
 
1.2 Problem Description 
According to Cybersecurity Ventures that is one of the world’s leading researcher for the global 
cyber economy, and a trusted source for cybersecurity facts, figures, and 
statistics.  Cybersecurity Ventures predicts global spending on cybersecurity products and 
services will exceed $1 trillion cumulatively over the five-year period from 2017 to 2021. 
Taken as a whole, we anticipate 12-15 percent year-over-year cybersecurity market growth 
through 2021. 
Worldwide spending on information security (a subset of the broader cybersecurity market) 
products and services will reach more than $114 billion (USD) in 2018, an increase of 12.4 
percent from last year, according to the latest forecast from Gartner, Inc. In 2019, the market 
is forecast to grow 8.7 percent to $124 billion [4]. 
At the same time, the vast amount of data available about activities is giving rise to 
cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Data, such as technical and non-technical 
28 
 
documentation, financial and health records, and intellectual property may be worth millions 
of euros in the hands of hackers and data thieves. If organizations and companies do not address 
data security issues, critical threats to information privacy may develop. Businesses and other 
organizations thus must take action to secure the sensitive data they control [5]. With the 
diffusion of the internet and new storage media, data may be compromised on a larger scale 
and at a faster pace. With the sharing of data on networks, a threat to data security is becoming 
a major concern. Protection of information is necessary to establish and maintain trust between 
an institution and its stakeholders. Usually, data protection is treated as a technological issue 
to deal with; however, protecting data is not just a technology issue anymore [6]. Entire 
management systems inside companies now are giving enormous attention to organizational 
aspect. Policies, proved objectives, audits, training and awareness activities, compliance with 
legal and regulatory requirements for security and privacy have become important factors to 
be addressed in information security. One of the main requirements toward all of this stands 
the assessment of risk and its evaluation [7]. Consequently, organizations and in particular 
companies must realize the necessity of paying attention to the organizational aspects of data 
protection. Therefore, managing data protection can be better treated addressing two points of 
view: the organizational and the technological ones. 
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1.3 The PhD goal: Objective and contributions 
This thesis describes and presents three years of work done at the “cybersecurity assurance and 
control” department at HITACHI Rail STS Company and at the University of Genoa. The work 
groups a set of solutions proposed, from the company point of view, to reach the main goal of 
the department, which is the data protection within the company. On the other hand, a research 
activity was also carried out at the university that aimed to classify web attacks using machine 
learning techniques. 
The title of this thesis is “The importance to manage data protection in the right way: Problems 
and solutions”, this title is chosen since the work represents a set of security solutions, which 
focuses on the management of data protection. It takes into account both the organizational and 
technological sides in proposing the approaches and methods, as stated in the subsection of the 
problem description. The work achieved can be divided into set of goals that are obtained 
particularly from the needs of the company and also the research community. These goals are 
organized into the following chapters: 
The work done at the company: 
 Chapter 3: A Data Protection Management Approach implemented by an innovative 
Information Security Management System. 
 Chapter 4: The Information Security Management System. 
 Chapter 5: A Comprehensive framework adopted in the security Risk management in 
Cyber Physical Systems. 
 Chapter 6: Proposing guidelines to aid enterprises in selecting an applicable SIEM 
solution. 
 Chapter 7: Risk Analysis Using PILAR software: An ISMS instructional document. 
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 Chapter 8: Conducting a Vulnerability Assessment Scan Using HPE Fortify Web 
Inspect: An ISMS instructional document 
The work done at the University: 
 Chapter 9: Classifying web attacks using network statistical features and machine 
learning: Analyzing the behavior of the attack generator. 
The main part of the work was done at the Company; it handled the issue of managing data 
protection in a systematic way, through proposing a Data protection management approach 
(chapter three), and the shows the ISMS implementing this approach (chapter four) [8]. After 
that, a comprehensive framework is designed for the security risk management of Cyber 
physical systems, this framework represents the strategy used to manage the security risk 
management [9], and it falls inside the ISMS (chapter five). 
In addition, inside the ISMS, another part of the work takes place (chapter six), suggesting the 
guidelines to select an applicable Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) solution 
[10]. At the end, a summary for the professional work at the company is carried out, showing 
the way risk analysis (chapter seven) and vulnerability assessment (chapter eight) are applied, 
the work is demonstrated by instructional documents that will be part of the Company’s ISMS. 
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Figure 2 shows how the goals are related and falls all inside the ISMS implementing the data 
protection management approach which is the main objective of the CSAC department at the 
Company. 
On the other hand, another research activity was accomplished to analyze the behavior of web-
based attacks using machine-learning techniques. Chapter 9 explains this part of the work and 
shows all the steps done and results obtained. 
 
 
 
The goal is to get more useful information about the attackers that might help us in the 
mitigation and future prevention process, and to analyze the ability to detect the type of 
Figure 3. PhD Goals: A research activity of classify web attacks using machine-learning techniques 
Figure 2. PhD Goals (related to the ISMS) 
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software used in generating web attacks. The work starts by first creating a dataset of web 
attacks that addresses this side, labeled not only by the attack type, but also by the tool used to 
generate it. Then, a two-layers classification model is trained using this dataset to reach our 
goal mentioned above; where the first layer will be used to detect the type of the attack, while 
the second will prove the ability to classify the attacking tool, and though to be used in detecting 
the attacking tool type. 
2 Chapter Two: Background and work aspects 
Information and communication technology (ICT) has made remarkable impact on the 
society, especially on companies and organizations. The use of computers, databases, servers, 
and other technologies has made an evolution on the way of storing, processing, and 
transferring data. However, companies access and share their data on internet or intranet, thus 
there is a critical need to protect this data from destructive forces and from the unwanted actions 
of unauthorized users. To design a solution that truly protects the data, we must understand the 
security requirements relevant to our site, and the scope of current threats to our data [11] [12].  
2.1 Hitachi Rail STS Company 
This PhD thesis was done at the Department of “Cybersecurity Assurance and Control” at 
Hitachi Rail STS Company. Hitachi Rail STS is a leading company operating in the sector of 
high technology for railway and urban transport. The Company has the experience and 
resources to supply innovative transport systems for freight yards, regional and freight lines, 
underground and tramway lines, and standard and High-Speed railway lines. With an 
international geographical organization, the Company operates worldwide as lead contractor, 
system integrator and supplier "turnkey" of the most important projects of mass transportation 
in metro and urban railways. Hitachi Rail STS has a great experience in the design, 
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implementation and management of systems and services for signaling and supervision of 
railway and urban traffic.  
2.1.1 The Cybersecurity Assurance and Control Department  
• The main goal of this department is managing Data Protection of the Company from 
both organizational and technological sides, in terms of: 
◦  Defining policies, plans, procedures,  
◦ Performing risk assessment and treatment studies, 
◦ Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing,  
◦ Incident management,  
◦ Control activities as audits or approvals and assuring compliance with 
international standards. 
• The department has its own strategy for managing data protection through an innovative 
Information Security Management System (ISMS) for managing Prevention, 
Monitoring, Detection and Reaction Phases. 
To manage data protection correctly, it is important to take in account some aspects in the 
procedure of data protection, the main aspects are: 
• Data classification levels. 
• Threats and Vulnerabilities. 
• Data security requirements. 
2.2 Data classification levels: 
Data is one of the strategical components of the corporate assets essential to a company. For 
this reason, it should be protected within a company in accordance with its own value and its 
significance to the company’s business by implementing a classification process. Data 
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classification is also useful to identify who should have access to the technical data used to run 
the business versus those who are permitted to access test data and programs under 
development. Data classification must take into account legal/regulatory /internal requirements 
for maintaining confidentiality, integrity and availability. Data classification should define the 
following:  
a. The owner of the information asset. 
b. Who has access rights (need to know). 
c. The level of access to be granted. 
d. Who is responsible for determining the access rights and access levels. 
e. Which approvals are needed for access. 
f. The extent and depth of security controls. 
However, data shall be classified by means of a method entailing an established structure of 
criticality and protection levels, which shall be determined in accordance with the potential 
impact on the company (e.g. the economic value, the damage to the company’s reputation, the 
legal constraints and the strategical significance). An example of the classification levels 
defined in a decreasing order of criticality can be as follows:  
 CONFIDENTIAL: Data concerning the company and/or its own subsidiaries, which 
may, when disclosed freely, cause an economical damage or affects the Company’s -
reputation. 
 RESTRICTED: Data that can be freely accessed by the personnel working at the 
Company. This is the default classification level that shall be assigned every time a new 
piece of information is created.  
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 PUBLIC: Data that can be freely disclosed outside the Company, since its disclosure 
shall cause no damage to the Company itself. 
In general, the data classification applies to confidentiality, integrity and availability. However, 
at Hitachi Rail STS, it was regulated only for confidentiality. 
2.3 Threats and Vulnerabilities: 
The two main kinds of security threats that affect a company are internal and external threats. 
Internal threats occur from within the organizations. This is probably one of the most dangerous 
situations because for instance co-workers may know passwords to access systems and are 
aware of how the systems are set up. Computers that are left unattended can be easily accessed 
by workers. And external threats are attacks done by hackers [11].  
 Internal Threats: Previous research on cybersecurity has focused on protecting valuable 
resources from attacks by out-siders. However, statistics [13] [14] show that a large 
amount of security and privacy breaches are due to insiders. Protection from insider 
threats is challenging because insiders may have access to many sensitive resources and 
high-privileged system accounts. Similar style of exploitation is reported in [15] [16]. 
 External threats: External threats are those done by individuals from outside a company 
or organization, who seeks to break defenses and exploit vulnerabilities. Spying or 
eavesdropping, Denial of Service (DoS), Spoofing, Phishing, viruses, etc..., are all 
examples of external threats or cyber-attacks. However one of the emerging threats and 
the latest criminal invention is the Ransomware which is a special type of virus that 
does not destroy any data but simply encrypts all the data it finds on a PC with an 
encryption key that only the criminal has, and asks for money to give the key.  
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 Vulnerabilities: Weakness in the organization or company cyber-assets that a malicious 
attacker could use to cause damage. Vulnerabilities could exist in system, installed 
software, and network. 
2.4 Data security requirements: 
Data security concerns the use of a broad range of information security controls to protect the 
whole system (potentially including the data, the applications or stored functions, the database 
systems, the database servers and the associated network links) against compromises of their 
confidentiality, integrity and availability [11]. Data protection must address these main security 
requirements: 
 Confidentiality: This means that data must not be exposed to unauthorized individuals. 
In addition, access must be restricted to those authorized to view the data. 
Confidentiality has several different aspects: privacy of communications, securing 
storage of data, authentication of users, and access control. 
 Integrity: Data integrity means that data should be protected from corruption while it 
is stored in the database or transmitted over the network. Integrity has different aspects: 
only authorized users can change data, protecting the network and data against viruses 
designed to corrupt or delete. 
 Availability: Data must be available to authorized users, without delay. Denial-of-
service attacks are attempts to block authorized users' ability to access and use the 
system when needed. Availability has different aspects: system resistance, 
performance, scalability should have adequate means [11].  
Hitachi Rail STS adopts an information security strategy described in chapter 3 by a data 
protection management approach, and implemented by an Information Security Management 
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System (ISMS) which describes the organizational aspects of data protection inside the 
company, adopting the governance, risk and compliance approach, the ISMS is presented in 
chapter 4. From a technological point of view, Hitachi Rail STS adopts a defense-in-depth 
approach and maturity models to deploy the security controls in a prioritized and effective way 
in accordance to the organization's overall strategies and policies. 
This thesis deals with more than one topic to reach the main goal, which is managing data 
protection. However, they all represents a part of the main cyber security strategy adopted by 
Hitachi Rail STS that is described by the data protection management approach (chapter 3) and 
implemented by the ISMS (chapter 4).  
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3 Chapter three: A data protection management approach 
developed by Hitachi Rail STS 
 
 
Figure 4. PhD goals: The Data Protection Management Approach implemented by an ISMS 
 
Data has become the most important asset for an organization or company, and data protection 
is fundamental to make an organization achieve its success. Data loss due to a malware 
infection can lead to critical consequences. It is dangerous if companies’ data fall into the 
wrong hands and it could be hard to recover, consequently data protection should be the key 
concern of companies and organizations. Most of the companies are connected to the internet 
for business reasons and this is potentially risky. Cyber-attacks, hacks and security breaches 
on the internet are no longer an exception [6]. The number of cyber-attacks is increasing, which 
may have a severe impact, economical too. Cybersecurity breaches can range from no or 
limited impact to Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS), stealing of data, manipulation of data, 
identity theft or even taking over control of systems and harm the physical world [17]. On the 
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other hand, some companies work on huge and critical projects that contain documentation that 
must be protected and not publicly disclosed. Data leakage or loss could lead to hazardous 
situations, so the confidentiality and integrity of data should be conserved. Companies must be 
prepared to protect the data: proactive plans and actions can reduce the effects of threats of any 
type. To reach this goal, it is better to adopt a good data protection management, which means 
having effective processes and methodologies in place to enable prevention, detection and 
reaction to any threat that could occur. Companies should give importance to actions, plans, 
polices, and address the organizational aspect and be aware and prepared to manage crisis 
situations. On the other side, they should work on technology, finding the best technological 
solution for each stage of the cybersecurity management.  
In this chapter, we present solutions and key steps to manage data protection inside a Company 
from both organizational and technological sides. On the first side, by proposing an 
Information Security Management System that implements the cybersecurity strategy of the 
company through the three phases of cybersecurity:  prevention, detection and reaction, and 
checks for compliance and improvement. And on the second side, by adopting a defense-in-
depth approach and maturity models to deploy the controls in a prioritized and effective way 
against threat scenarios. 
Data protection aims to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of 
company data and information whether it is processed, transmitted, stored on and/or in transit 
through networks and systems. Data protection  involves the protection of all the cyber-space 
used in the company to store, process and transfer this data against unauthorized use, 
disclosure, transfer, modifications or destruction, whether accidental or intentional, or the loss 
of availability of these assets or business processes to authorized users. Data protection is 
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ensured by an information security (cybersecurity) strategy used to secure all assets involved 
in the storage, processing, transmission of data such as databases, computers, servers, network 
devices, etc.  
The need for cybersecurity is becoming increasingly important due to our dependence on 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to store, process and transmit data. 
Companies do not want to be associated with cybersecurity hacks or viewed as having not 
taken appropriate security measures [17].  On the other hand, different types of threats and 
vulnerabilities that threatens company data varies between internal and external ones, and this 
requires different types of countermeasures that starts by setting plans, policies, complying to 
laws and standards, training internal staff, and so on, and also setting appropriate 
countermeasures. For this reason, data protection requires a strategy that covers both 
organizational and technological security aspects inside a company, applied on the 
cybersecurity phases of prevention, detection, and reaction (Fig 5). 
 
Figure 5. Data protection strategy process 
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 From the organizational point of view, it is essential to set policies, actions, plans, 
responsibilities and ensure audits. On the technological side, the goal is to specify and 
implement the selected controls in the policies against threat scenarios. Both aspects should 
cover all phases of cybersecurity: 
 
i. Prevention phase: proactive phase for the defense of company assets.  
ii. Detection phase: monitoring of company assets. 
iii. Reaction phase: incident management. 
 
In this chapter, we propose a data protection management approach aiming to protect the 
company’s data both from the organizational and the technological side, which was inspired 
by the ISO 27001 requirements. This approach is implemented by an ISMS from an 
organizational aspect, and follows the Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) framework. 
In addition, from the technological aspect, a defense in depth approach is adopted to deploy 
the controls selected by type and in a prioritized and effective way. 
3.1 The organizational side: An Information Security Management System 
(ISMS): 
An ISMS is a systematic approach for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, 
reviewing, maintaining and improving an organization’s information security to achieve 
business objectives. The goal of ISMS is to minimize risk and ensure continuity by pro-actively 
limiting the impact of a security breach [18]. An Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, 
collectively managed by an organization, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.  
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The ISMS shall be balanced and integrated into the daily actions of employees; in addition, it 
shall be balanced among business goals, productivity and ensuring adequate data protection 
levels of the company and it shall ensure the privacy of employees. Business and IT staff which 
are relevant for information security activities shall be trained in order to ensure the application 
of the defined ISMS, and awareness initiatives shall be deployed to all employees. Next chapter 
describes in details the ISMS, its components and how it implements the information security 
process. 
3.2 Technological point of view: Defense in depth approach 
Data protection from a technological side is about executing the ISMS plans and operations, 
by selecting the right counter measures, specifying their types, prioritizing them by maturity 
levels, day-to-day operation, etc. To fully protect the data during its lifetime, each component 
of the information system must have its own protection mechanisms. The building up, layering 
on and overlapping of security measures is called defense in depth. Defense in Depth (DiD) is 
an efficient operational approach that enables to manage (with a risk-oriented approach) 
people, processes and technology. In IT environments, DiD is intended to increase the costs of 
an attack against the organization, by detecting attacks, allowing time to respond to such 
attacks, and providing layers of defense so that even successful attacks will not fully 
compromise an organization. A DiD strategy is necessary because of the new security threats 
and the importance of IT security monitoring of assets. Main variables that have increased the 
importance of DiD strategy definition are for example: the increased value of data, 
globalization, mobile working, virtualization, and decentralization of services. In this context, 
the company shall recognize the need to provide coordinated and multi-layered security 
architectures to mitigate security risks. Implementing DiD requires an understanding of 
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enterprise strategy, applicable internal and external threats, information asset classification, 
and technology supporting controls. The Defense in Depth strategy shall define all layers and 
technologies which, given company environment and security requirements, are necessary for 
all the different parts of the organization, as depicted in the figure below. Referring to Best 
Practice and Guidelines, Hitachi Rail STS adopted the DiD by using five levels to describe 
security actions based on the plans and policies of the ISMS. 
 
Figure 6. Defense in depth: Layering and setting technologies 
 
Referring to Maturity Model, Hitachi Rail STS intended their policies to be applicable 
completely, although at a different pace, so they divided them according their complexity (to 
verify where controls would go deeper and where has been less deep). The maturity levels are 
used to set the level of security and control of a specific configuration or solution. The Maturity 
Model adopted by the company includes the following maturity levels:  
L1: INITIAL  
 Minimum set of acceptable security measures and control activities are designed 
and in place.  
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 Security measures and control activities have been documented and communicated 
to stakeholders and interested parties.  
L2: IMPROVED  
 Standardized controls with periodic testing for effective design and operation with 
reporting to management are in place.  
 Improved or selected security measures are in place to harden specific controls or 
business areas.  
 Automation and tools may be used in a limited way to support control activities 
and security measures effectiveness.  
L3: OPTIMIZED  
 An integrated control framework with real-time monitoring by management for 
continuous improvement (enterprise-wide risk management) of the security 
measures is in place.  
 Automation and tools are widely used to support control activities and allow the 
organization to make rapid changes to the security measure in place.  
 High level of security measures are available, addressing the trade-off between 
residual risk and costs.  
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4 Chapter four: The Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) 
In this chapter, we describe the proposed ISMS, which is adopted by Hitachi Rail STS, and 
used to manage data protection inside the company. The ISMS implements the whole 
information security process used to protect the data within the company. Both information 
security and information technology departments are involved, and they have the responsibility 
and accountability of executing the sub process. 
 
Figure 7. PhD goals (related to the ISMS): The Information security management system (ISMS) 
 
Data must be treated as the core asset of any organization or company, which should be 
protected from all kinds of threats. However, to best protect the data, it is better to adopt a good 
management approach, which minimizes errors, saves time, increases awareness and prepares 
the company against incidents. In information security, taking due care of strategies, setting 
policies, plans, preparing and training staff, and complying with internal or external laws and 
standards should be given the same importance as operating technical tools. The focus should 
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be on both organizational and technical sides. Hitachi Rail STS Company gives a great 
significance to the organizational side of data protection, which is shown by its ISMS which 
was created in accordance with the international standards and frameworks. 
Hitachi Rail STS implements an ISMS, and related documents are created, developed and 
published as means to implement data protection strategy, in accordance with the company 
business requirements, strategies, and relevant laws, regulations, and contractual agreements. 
The ISMS is based on a governance, risk and compliance (GRC) framework [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Governance: Governance activities involve setting objectives to achieve and defining a 
way to achieve them while maintaining transparency with internal and external 
stakeholders. Governance tools, such as system controls and policies, are implemented in 
order to ensure that processes are followed in a proper manner. 
The Governance includes all activities necessary to define and implement a framework 
aimed at ensuring a proper data protection management. The main activities should define: 
roles and responsibilities, processes, policies and procedures (including supporting and 
Figure 8. The GRC framework 
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monitoring tools), audit plans. Main activities reported above must be executed according 
to the Segregation of Duties (SoD) principle. SoD aims at avoiding situations where a 
single person could execute or control several phases of the same process, or different 
processes identified as incompatible. The aim is to mitigate potential exposures to human 
mistakes or fraud events. Correct implementation of data protection strategy is verified 
through periodical audits performed by IS departments and by third parties. 
 
b. Risk: Risk Management activities involve risk identification, assessment and mitigation 
plan definition. All risk management activities shall be performed on an ongoing basis in 
order to ensure that new risks are identified and previous identified risk are mitigated. Risk 
management acts as an internal control system that has to grow together with the business 
growth.  The process of assessment, management and monitoring of risks through 
establishing and maintaining an appropriate risk framework is performed by the IS 
Manager. The assessment allows to identify the action plan to put forth in order to mitigate 
the identified risks and protect the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of assets.  
 
c. Compliance (Compliance to international standards and norms): Compliance 
activities involve regulatory analysis in order to ensure the compliance with global and 
local applicable laws. Applicable laws are identified on the basis of the regulatory 
framework applicable to industry and country in which the company operates.  Compliance 
can be oriented to internal policies and rules or to external laws and regulations, but in any 
case it represents a fundamental step in order to maintain the organization control inside 
its specific regulatory environment. In this context, compliance shall:  
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 Be maintained with all applicable national and international privacy legislation, and 
with international information security standards such as ISO/IEC 27001, GDPR 
(General Data Protection Manager) or other equivalent best practice/regulation 
required by the business. 
 Ensure that all employees and third parties follow all security requirements. 
 Ensure that all employees and collaborators as well as third parties with access to 
information systems are aware of their responsibility to report any security incident 
as quickly as possible.  
 
4.1 The information security process implemented by the ISMS:  
The activities of an information security (IS) process implemented by the ISMS can be divided 
into four vertical domains with different responsibilities and accountabilities represented by 
the company area in the figure below: 
  
 
 
 
Figure 9. The information security process implemented by the ISMS for data protection 
management 
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Governance, design, execution and control are the four sub processes of the IS process 
implemented by the ISMS, where each sub-process has a set of goals: 
-Governance & Risk: defining strategy, policy (security levels), requirements 
(constraints), procedures, and conformity depending on internal or external 
requirements, laws and international standards. Then evaluate the Risk and identify the 
countermeasures to be taken to obtain an acceptable level of risk. 
-Design: defining information security architectures and technology solutions based on 
the countermeasures to be adopted and the approved budget in accordance with the 
defined strategy. 
-Operation (Operate and Execute): putting the activities defined into operations, 
including the new transitions, the change of existing ones, day-by-day operations and 
maintenance of the equipment.  
-Control: assessing the adherence of current levels and security configurations to the 
policy, requirements and compliance set out in governance phase. 
 
4.2 Segregation of duties 
The ISMS is better developed in accordance to the “segregation of duties” principle as stated 
by the A6.1.2 control of Annex A in ISO 27001. The A6.1.2 control of the ISO 27001 states 
that conflicting tasks and areas of responsibility must be separated to reduce the chances of 
misuse, unauthorized or unintentional modification of the assets of the organization [19]. Each 
phase has a responsible department within the company, with the Information Security (IS) 
Department and the Information Technology (IT) Department being the involved departments. 
• Governance: The IS department has responsibility and accountability for this phase.  
• Design: The IT Dept. has responsibility and accountability for this phase.  
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• Operation: The IT Department has the responsibility and the accountability for this phase. 
However, under this phase, the IS Dept. retains responsibility and accountability for the 
Incident Management task. In case an incident occurs, the IS department tries to understand 
the incident, find a solution and define the remediation, and finally gives the IT department 
the procedure to apply. 
• Control: The IS department has responsibility and accountability for this phase. 
4.3 Documentation of the ISMS 
At the end, the documentation of the ISMS should be also carried out. There are five main 
categories of documents used to describe the ISMS of Hitachi Rail STS Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Process Description (PRD): It is a high level describing the whole ISMS with – and includes 
all the responsible, accountable, consulted and informed departments involved in the ISMS. 
Manual (MNL): This type of documents is a high-level directive. They describe the strategy, 
governance, and rules. 
Figure 10. Documentation of different components the ISMS 
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Procedures (PRC): These documents indicate who does what. They describe the responsible 
individuals and their duties. 
Instruction (INS): These are the instructional documents. They give a brief description for the 
way of operation or installation indication how it is done.  
Module - Template – Checklist (FOR): these are forms or check lists that must be filled for the 
purpose of requesting a service from the IT department for example. 
  
52 
 
5 Chapter five: A comprehensive framework to achieve a high 
common level strategy for the risk management of cyber-
physical systems 
There are several approaches followed to analyze and treat risks in the systems that rely on 
information technology. In general, these approaches try to measure or estimate the probability 
and the severity of the risks and at the end find solutions to minimize those risks. This chapter 
proposes an innovative framework designed to manage the risks in systems that depend on 
information technology. Inside the ISMS, falls this comprehensive framework. It is one of the 
strategies added to the ISMS and can an be followed in any risk management projects. 
 
Figure 11. PhD goals (related to the ISMS): A framework for the security risk management in CPSs 
 
Hitachi Rail STS Company works on projects in the field of railways, which are Cyber physical 
systems. A Cyber Physical System (CPS) is an intelligent complex system that combines 
diverse set of levels and types of computation and physical components, which are tightly 
integrated.  CPS is facing huge security risks, especially cyber-attacks that can cause disruption 
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to physical services or create a national disaster. Information and communication technology 
(ICT) has made remarkable impact on the society, especially on companies and organizations. 
As a CPS relies basically on information and communication technology, this puts the system’s 
assets under certain risks, and hence they must be kept under control by means of security 
countermeasures that generate confidence in the use of these assets. Therefore, there is a critical 
need to focus and give a great attention on the cybersecurity of these systems, which 
consequently leads to the safety of the physical world. An efficient risk assessment study 
applied to CPSs helps in the preparation against the crisis situations. This goal is achieved by 
adopting a solution that applies processes, plans and actions to prevent or reduce the effects of 
threats. Traditional IT risk assessment methods can do the job, however, and because of the 
characteristics of a CPS, it is more efficient to adopt a solution that is wider than a method, and 
address the type, functionalities and complexity of a CPS. This chapter describes a proposed 
framework that breaks the restriction to a traditional risk assessment method and encompasses 
wider set of procedures to achieve a high common level framework that could be adopted in 
the risk management process of cyber-physical systems. 
A cyber-physical system refers to the systems that combine both cyber and physical resources, 
where there is a strong relation and coordination between these resources. Such systems are 
controlled or monitored by computer-based algorithms, tightly integrated with the internet and 
its users. CPS is basically a control system with distributed networked, adapted and predictable, 
real-time, intelligent characteristics, where human-computer interaction may exist. It is widely 
used in critical national infrastructure, such as electric power, petroleum and chemical and so 
on [20].  Moreover, many urban transportation and railway systems around the world have 
deployed some form of communications-based automatic train control (e.g., [21], [22]). In 
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those systems, multiple cyber components, including wireless communication. The potential 
implications of this evolution could be multi-faceted and profound, especially when it comes 
to the issue of security. If such systems were subject to a physical or cyber threat, the 
consequences will be unimaginable. These systems are susceptible to different types of risks 
related to information systems vulnerabilities. No one doubt about the hazardous consequences 
that would occur in case a malicious software succeeds in controlling the system, i.e. any fail 
in systems controlling drive-less metros will lead to huge loss. Security breaches in the cyber 
domain, such as falsified information or malicious control logic, can have a complicated impact 
on the physical domain [23]. “The cyber breach will lead to complicated physical 
consequences”. Cybersecurity breaches can range from no or limited impact to Distributed 
Denial of Services (DDoS), stealing of data, or even taking over control of systems and harm 
the physical world [17]. In power industry, the monitoring system of a power plant was 
attacked by unknown sources in 2010, which leaded to 900MW load loss in 7 seconds. In 
energy industry, the computer system of Iran Bushehr nuclear power plant was invaded by 
“Stuxnet” in 2010, leading a serious chaos in the automated operation of the nuclear facilities 
and a serious setback of Iran’s nuclear program. In transport service, in the network for 
managing and monitoring the operation of the Shinkansen, due to an exception in the 
management system of control schedule, signaling and line switching point in 2011, Japan's 5 
Shinkansen operation management system encountered failure, 15 trains were in outage, 124 
trains were delayed and 8.12 million people’s travel were affected. In this way, we can 
conclude that CPS security is so important that risk incidents in the system may affect national 
security and stability. Taking all these security incidents seriously, we conclude that any attack 
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in the cyber layer of the cyber physical system could lead to hazardous situations and even to 
loss in lives [20]. 
There are several approaches for the problem of risk assessment and treatment: informal 
handbooks, methodical approaches or supporting tools, where all provide a guide for risk 
assessment and treatment. However, methods might differ in some steps, or in the way of 
identifying and valuating the assets or threats. Some are basically used in cyber security of 
information systems, and others can be used in physical security. Many of the proposed 
solutions tries to measure or estimate the probability and the severity of the risks after 
identifying the assets and threats using traditional IT risk assessment methods. Some of these 
solutions did not address the characteristics and the complexity of CPS, which needs a broad 
range of management. The great challenge of these approaches is the complexity of the problem 
they have to face; complexity in the sense that there are many elements to be considered and, 
if it is not done rigorously, the conclusions will be unreliable.  
Hitachi Rail STS is a leading Company operating in the sector of high technology for Railway 
and Urban Transport. Hitachi Rail STS has a great experience in the design, implementation 
and management of systems and services for signaling and supervision of railway and urban 
traffic [24]. 
Hitachi Rail STS believes that there is a critical need to adopt a comprehensive strategy for the 
problem of applying risk management study to a cyber physical system. However, the 
complexity of the CPS is greater and such systems need more procedures to be performed. So 
this chapter proposes a framework that aims to reach a common high level solution, it is 
different and broader than a traditional IT risk management methods where their goal is mainly 
focused on identifying and measuring the severity of the risks and try to reduce it to an 
acceptable extent. However, it encompasses seven steps and inspired by the PDCA cycle, and 
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centered upon the cyber side and its assets; however, this doesn’t mean that the physical assets 
are out of the frame, as the physical assets of a CPS are mostly controlled by others in the cyber 
side. This framework is characterized by a set of procedures that starts by modeling the 
system’s assets and functionalities, selection of potential threats to the CPS, conducting risk 
assessment and treatment through a methodical way, vulnerability assessment, ensuring the 
compliance with global and local applicable laws, and finally applying maintenance and 
improvement activities. This chapter presents a set of aspects that the approach mentions, and 
then describes the proposed framework and a case study that shows how Hitachi Rail STS 
Company applies this framework. 
 
5.1 Aspects and Requirements: 
5.1.1  Cyber physical system security: 
CPS security has some distinct characteristics as it is different from traditional IT system. In 
traditional IT system the first important aspect of information security is confidentiality. 
Confidentiality means the protection of data, providing access for those who are allowed to see 
it while disallowing others from learning anything about its content. However for CPS, the 
availability comes first, then the integrity and confidentiality. 
CPS has more attack points and fault points than IT system. Any safeguard measures shall not 
interrupt the response to the physical system or delay the response. In traditional IT system 
access control can be deployed without affecting the services of IT system. In CPS all these 
measures should be discussed and tested to great details. The data flow shall not be hindered 
or interfered. CPS is a system of systems, the tight coupling between the physical system and 
cyber system has led to potential cascade effect of the whole system. Malfunction whether in 
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cyber part or in the physical part will spread to other part of system. The attack points of CPS 
are no longer confined to cyber-attacks from the Internet [20]. 
5.1.2 Dependencies and Accumulated risk: 
As mentioned above, it is more efficient for a security strategy to start with functional modeling 
of assets, by defining relations and dependencies, as it leads to more precise and coherent study. 
Dependencies affect all the calculations done to assess the risk. Since assets depend on each 
other, the occurrence of threats on assets causes a direct harm on them and an indirect harm on 
others that depend on them.  
5.1.3 Security requirements: 
The cyber security of CPS corresponds the use of a wide set of security controls to protect the 
whole system against compromises of their confidentiality, integrity and availability. The 
cybersecurity of CPS must address these main security requirements:  
 Integrity: It means that only the authorized users can change in the assets, it is 
satisfied if the assets are not changed by an unauthorized party. 
 Confidentiality: This means that the assets must not be exposed to unauthorized 
individuals. And access must be restricted to those authorized. This is satisfied if 
the assets are not read or accessed by an unauthorized party. 
 Availability: is satisfied if the assets or services are available and without delay. 
If the system was exposed to malicious activities, consequently physical components will be 
affected and even damaged. It can be said that in a CPS, the availability comes first, then the 
integrity and confidentiality. It is quite simple that if the cyber system was under attack, the 
physical processes might be no longer under control and the consequence will be disastrous.   
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5.2 Related Work 
Traditional IT risk assessment methods can achieve part of the work to mitigate the risks in 
a CPS, however, and because of the characteristics of a CPS, it is more efficient to adopt a 
solution that is wider than a method, and address the type, functionalities and complexity of 
a CPS. Some of those methods include MEHARI, EBIOS and MAGARIT. 
5.2.1 MEHARI 
MEHARI  (MEthod for Harmonized Analysis of RIsk) is an Risk Assessment (RA) and 
Risk Management (RM) method, it  is an Open Source and free methodology integrated 
and achieved for the assessment and management of risks associated to information and 
its treatments. MEHARI is developed and updated since 1996 by CLUSIF and 
CLUSIQ. It includes, directly in its knowledge bases, many formulas for the direct 
assessment of risk and selection of the ways to reduce them. MEHARI gives indications 
for the business stakes identification and valuation, the resulting classification of assets 
(according to ISO 27005) for the Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality security 
criteria is performed. Also the likelihood of the various threats is identified and the 
evaluation of the security measures to reduce the risk may be collected from audit 
questionnaires. All the elements for risk evaluation are available for the next phases, 
MEHARI knowledge bases provide comprehensive lists of risk scenarios associated 
with the assets and the various threats. The combination of stakes, threats and 
vulnerabilities included in the method allows analyzing the risks situations and 
preparing for the risk assessment.  
For risk assessment, using MEHARI the critical risks may be displayed and analyzed 
under various other forms: by asset criterion, type of threat, actor, etc. For risk 
treatment, the risk managers or auditors have the capacity to select the treatment option 
(reduce, accept, transfer/share, avoid) and, in the case of a decision of reduction, 
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MEHARI provides the capability to select the additional security measures for the 
reduction of likelihood and/or impact and to integrate them in additional projects 
depending on the level of the resources and types of organization [25]. 
5.2.2 EBIOS 
EBIOS (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité - 
Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives) is a method for analysis, 
evaluation and action on risks relating to information systems. It generates a security 
policy adapted to the needs of an organization. The method was created in 1995 and is 
now maintained by the ANSSI, a department of the French Prime Minister. 
EBIOS is a comprehensive set of guides (plus a free open source software tool) 
dedicated to Information System risk managers. Originally developed by the French 
government, it is now supported by a club of experts of diverse origin. This club is a 
forum on Risk Management, active in maintaining EBIOS guides. It produces best 
practices as well as application documents targeted to end-users in various contexts. 
EBIOS is widely used in the public as well as in the private sector, both in France and 
abroad. It is compliant with major IT security standards. 
EBIOS gives risk managers a consistent and high-level approach to risks. It helps them 
acquire a global and coherent vision, useful for support decision-making by top 
managers on global projects (business continuity plan, security master plan, security 
policy), as well as on more specific systems (electronic messaging, nomadic networks 
or web sites for instance). 
EBIOS approach consists of a cycle of 5 phases: 
 Phase 1 deals with context analysis in terms of global business process dependency on 
the information system. 
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 Both the security needs analysis and threat analysis are conducted in phases 2 and 3 in 
a strong dichotomy, yielding an objective vision of their conflicting nature. 
 In phases 4 and 5, this conflict, once arbitrated through a traceable reasoning, yields an 
objective diagnostic on risks. The necessary and sufficient security objectives (and 
further security requirements) are then stated, proof of coverage is furnished, and 
residual risks made explicit [26]. 
5.2.3 MAGERIT 
See chapter 7. 
 
However, the common point between these methods is that they do the job in the traditional 
way and might not be suitable for systems like CPS. They start by identifying risks, analyzing 
and evaluating them, then trying to mitigate by risk treatment phase, then acceptance and 
communication stages. And as mentioned before, those traditional risk assessment methods 
lacks for some essential procedures such as system functional modeling or asset modeling, 
threat modeling or selection, vulnerability assessment, compliance, an implementing-safeguard 
approach, and at the end the maintenance and improvements, which are all included in the 
proposed framework in this chapter. These procedures included in the proposed framework, 
might aid in the risk management of systems like CPS, which are considered complex and need 
to be managed in a very structured manner, and assert successful performance. 
5.3 The proposed comprehensive framework for the risk management in CPS 
Commonly, when there is a need to assess risks, traditional methods are used to do the job. 
Traditional risk management methods involve the following steps:  risk identification, 
assessment and mitigation plan definition. However, a well-designed risk assessment of CPS 
will provide an overall view of CPS security status and support efficient allocations of 
safeguard resources. Though traditional IT system risk assessment is quite mature, a distinct 
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risk assessment method for CPS is needed to cover the growing security issues due to the large 
differences between IT system and CPS [20]. This chapter presents a framework inspired by 
the PDCA (PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT) cycle.  The proposed framework adds a boarder set of 
procedures for a traditional risk assessment method.  
 
Figure 12. The proposed framework inspired by the PDCA cycle 
 
In order to assure compliance with Security and safety requirements, Hitachi Rail STS needs 
to define and adopt a holistic framework for Risk Assessment and Treatment activities of CPSs. 
Figure 12 show how each step of the framework falls inside one of the phases of the PDCA 
cycle. It is a divided into the following seven steps: 
i. System Functional Modeling 
ii. Threat Selection and Modeling 
iii. Applying Risk Management method (Assessment and Treatment plan) 
iv. Safeguard implementation: Appropriate Security Governance model 
v. Vulnerability assessment 
vi. Compliance and Validation 
vii. Maintenance and Improvement 
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To ensure the continuous improvement, the framework is based on Deming PDCA Cycle where 
each phase, because of the complexity of a CPS, can by divided further in a few steps (Fig.13 
shows the 7 steps). The steps are applied in order: starting with the “PLAN” phase, first step is 
“System Functional Modeling” which designs the model for the CPS system showing the 
functionalities, dependencies, relations between the assets and defines also rules and 
Acceptable Risk Levels. Then the second step is “Threat Modeling and Selection”, it selects 
the potential “threats” that match the CPS’s assets: this can be done by referring to historical 
data such as reports, statistics, observations, logs, etc. In particular to execute these actions a 
dedicated commercial tool, called RMAT, has been identified and adopted. Finally, always in 
PLAN phase, the first two steps are the input to the “Risk Management” step, where an 
appropriate method is selected to assess the risk (Risk Assessment) and helps in selecting the 
appropriate measures for keeping the risks under control (Risk Treatment). For performing this 
job, Hitachi Rail STS has identified and adopted a commercial tool, named PILAR, that 
implements a method called MAGERIT which is suggested by the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security (ENISA). 
 After that, “Safeguard Implementation” takes place, reflecting the “DO” phase of a PDCA, 
where the chosen decisions in the Plan phase are put into operation. At Hitachi Rail STS, the 
Defense in depth (DiD) approach is adopted while implementing safeguards: this approach, 
based on layering, helps in faster detection and slowing down attacks. 
Afterwards there is the CHECK phase, represented by the “Vulnerability Assessment and 
Penetration Test” process: it plays a key role in revealing the vulnerabilities yet present on the 
system and not protected by already installed safeguards. Because a CPS contains various set 
of HW/SW assets such as network appliances, servers, end-points, applications, web services, 
databases, etc., the Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Test activity is applied basically 
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on 3 levels: Application, Network and Operation System Levels. Based on all previous findings 
and evidences, the CHECK phase is completed by a compliance control to ensure complying 
of the system to security best practices or international standards, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001/27002.  
Finally, the Deming Cycle is concluded by the ACT phase which contains “Maintenance and 
Improvement” activities to correct and improve the system. 
 
5.3.1 System functional Modeling (Asset Modeling):  
Creating a system functional model has a great impact in showing the structure and the 
components of the CPS, and in demonstrating the relations and the dependencies between the 
different assets, and so to have a clear and precise simulation for the system in real life.  It is 
the step where the whole framework depends on, in this stage it is meant to model the physical 
and cyber components and their interactions and operational characteristics. Asset Modeling 
can be considered as the most important step in this approach. This step must be done first with 
the owners of the system. The scope of this part is to help the system owners or information 
Figure 13. Hitachi Rail STS’s framework for the Risk Assessment and Treatment of Cyber Physical system. 
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sources in creating a system functional model and in the valuation of the system’s assets. For 
this task, two steps are followed: 
a) Creating a functional model for the system, which is a structured representation of the 
system’s components (assets) and functions (activities, processes, operations). 
b) Rating of the assets (based on CIA) using criticality levels and according to the 
consequences on CIA that would happen case of their protection failure.  
The two steps must be done by the owners or under the supervision of them. In this way, a 
typical representation or a general view for the system is carried out which aids in the risk 
management study. 
5.3.2 Threat Selection/ and Modeling: 
Each CPS differs by the services and functionalities that it offers. Threats vary from one system 
to another, based on the available assets and their level of valuation.  Different cyber physical 
systems means different assets and though different types of threats. Threats can be grouped 
and associated to homogenous group of assets called asset classes. Threat selection is about 
understanding the most suitable threats that are expected to happen and matching them with 
the different asset classes of the cyber physical system. The appropriate threats-to-assets should 
be selected in this step to be fed into the “Risk Management study” step, and should be 
applicable to the assets presented in the previous step. Mainly cyber-security threats are 
covered; that is, threats applying to information and communication technology assets, but 
additional non-IT threats could also be included in order to cover threats to physical assets that 
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are necessary for the operation of the CPS. This work can be done by referring to historical 
data such as reports, statistics, observations, logs, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ENISA Threat Landscape provides an overview of threats, together with current and 
emerging trends. It is based on publicly available data and provides an independent view on 
observed threats, threat agents and threat trends. Over 140 recent reports from security industry, 
networks of excellence, standardization bodies and other independent institutes have been 
analyzed [27] ; the figure above shows a sample for threats that threaten cyber physical 
systems. However, risk analysts are responsible for selecting and valuating the appropriate and 
expected threats that are likely to occur and match the system’s assets. First, the general model 
is obtained by experts, reports, statistics, and then threats that match the context, type of the 
CPS and the given assets are kept and fed to the next step. Threat Modeling eases the risk 
analysis study in various ways; mainly it prepares a wealthy and substantial threats-to-assets 
convenient dataset that fits a case study. There are dedicated tools that help in threat modeling, 
and section 5.3.2 shows one of them which is used by Hitachi Rail STS Company. 
Figure 14. Common threats for the “Threat selection and Modeling” step in CPS 
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5.3.3 Risk management plan: 
Risk management is divided into risk analysis and treatment, risk analysis is a systematic 
process for estimating the risks to which the system’s assets are exposed. Risk management is 
the part of planning, while in treatment is where decisions are taken. These decisions are 
demonstrated and established in the implementation step. 
 
a. Risk analysis: A risk can be defined as the degree of exposure to a threat that may occur 
on one or more assets causing damage, it is an indicator of what could happen to the assets 
if not properly protected. It is important to know what features are of interest in each asset 
and to what extent these features are in danger, that is, analyze the system. There are several 
methods and ways for the problem of analyzing the risks: informal handbooks, methodical 
approaches or supporting tools, where all provide a guide for risk analysis. However, 
methods might differ in some steps, or in the way of identifying and valuating the assets or 
threats. Some are basically used in cyber security of information systems, and others can 
be used in physical security. Risk analysis study must be applied using an appropriate 
method and tool for the risk analysis step in the cybersecurity of CPSs. Applying a risk 
analysis study includes:  
i. Identifying and classifying assets by types, establishing dependencies between 
them and evaluating them according to security requirements 
ii. Identifying and valuating threats and their likelihood. 
iii. Identifying current safeguards and valuating them according to the level of 
effectiveness. 
iv. Evaluating the risk on the CPS where valuations for assets, dependencies, and 
threats are all involved in the calculation. 
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b. Treatment plan: On the other hand, this sub-step must also carry out the risk treatment 
activities that should be applied. Risk treatment activities allow a security plan to be 
prepared which, when implemented and operated, meets the proposed objectives with 
the level of risk accepted by the Management. In the treatment plan, the right counter 
measures are selected with types, and then prioritized. Moreover defining their 
cost/complexity, effectiveness and efficiency metrics must be also addressed. The 
objective is to deploy the controls selected by type and in a prioritized and effective 
way. For example, same safeguard can contrast more threats at the same time and 
overlapping/redundant safeguards must be avoided. However, sometimes, when a 
series of safeguards are in place and the management process is mature to a certain 
extent, the system will still be exposed to a risk called “residual”. 
5.3.4 Safeguard implementation: Operations 
This step deals with the implementation of security plans and decisions taken in the treatment 
plan, it takes as input the activities defined and puts them into operation. It also deals with the 
technical side, and defines the best technological solutions based on the countermeasures to be 
adopted and the approved budget in accordance with the defined strategy.  Implementation of 
safeguards must ensure the availability and the capability of the organizational staff to manage 
the tasks scheduled to implement them, as well as other factors, such as the budget of the 
organization, relations with other bodies, legal, regulatory or contractual changes, etc. 
Even when the risks have been treated, residual risks will generally remain. Residual risk 
means that the current level of risk is accepted and is under a “careful chosen” threshold, where 
trying to eliminate it could be extremely expensive. So applying security patches and ensuring 
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the secure configuration of all appliances is maintained continuously, also assets are monitored 
and logs are analyzed to detect any improper actions. 
5.3.5 Vulnerability Assessment: 
Vulnerability is a weakness in the assets that a malicious attacker could use to cause damage. 
Increasingly sophisticated tools help to penetrate existing network connections. After 
implementing the safeguards in the previous steps, a vulnerability management process is 
needed to check if the assets of the cyber physical system are really still exploitable to threats. 
At the technical level, this is done by vulnerability exposure tools, with simulation of attack 
paths (similar to MITRE attack matrix). The end result can be patch management or better, in 
some complex environment, virtual patching (i.e. putting layer of defense that stop the attack 
before it reaches the endpoint, without the need to change configs of the endpoint itself). 
Furthermore, log analysis could be useful in revealing vulnerabilities; it requires much expert, 
knowledge, and maybe time consuming to do manual log analysis. At the end, when detecting 
irregular issues, it is required to return to the iteration cycles for proposals and solutions.  
5.3.6 Compliance:  
Assessing the adherence of security configurations to the policies, requirements and regulations 
are set out in this stage. Compliance activities also involve regulatory analysis in order to 
ensure the compliance with global and local applicable laws based on the requirements, or even 
with respect to verification schemes to be achieved or maintained. And in case of non-
compliance, it is required to return to the iteration cycles for proposals and solutions.  
5.3.7 Maintenance and Improvements: 
Finally, the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the applied safeguards is measured 
to achieve the needed improvement and maintenance. It is recommended to deploy some 
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elements that allow controlling the measures implemented in order to assess their effectiveness 
and to have an insight about them to figure out if there are new problems or there is a need to 
update their level. 
 
5.4 Applying the security Risk Management proposed framework for a CPS 
This section shows how the proposed framework is applied at Hitachi Rail STS Company. 
Each subsection describes the procedure followed. The 7 steps are demonstrated below, 
showing how they were applied to achieve this overall high level framework of Risk analysis 
and treatment for CPS. 
5.4.1 System Functional Model 
The first step is to design a functional model for the system, i.e. it is fundamental to define the 
scope of the system, the basic components forming the CPS and their composing assets 
(physical and cyber), and also establishing the relations and dependencies between them. This 
step is done based on information coming from the owners, since they are familiar and have 
the knowledge about their system. The functional model will be used to rate the assets against 
the basic security dimensions Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA traid), as shown 
in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then provide a high level asset rating for each with the assistance of the system’s owners and 
based on the tables defined below. Figure 16 gives an example of the asset’s security 
Figure 15. A system functional 
model example for the CPS 
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dimensions rating, where each asset has a triad rating that represents respectively the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Rating assets 
The assets’ rating is carried out on each security dimension. Rating represents a pre-valuation 
step for the assets, where  criticality levels are defined. These levels will be used with a scale 
from 1 to 4, where “1” describes the lowest critical level and “4” is the highest. And so, each 
security dimension gets one of the four levels representing the rate value. For each level, a 
description is given that helps in choosing the suitable asset’s level. The three tables below 
explain the levels of rating according each security dimension.  
Table 1. Asset’s Rating levels for Confidentiality 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Level 
 
 
Title 
 
 Description 
 
Consequence in case of loss 
of confidentiality 
 
 
4 
  
Confidential Asset  
 
Asset with a special sensitivity that must 
be accessed by special authorized staff or 
services.  
 
Serious impact: Damage could 
affect directly the system, 
customer or organizations.  
 
3    Restricted Asset 
 
Assets that must be accessed only by 
authorized staff members or services.  
 
Significant impact: the reputation 
of the system can be harmed.  
 
 
2 
   Internal Asset 
 
Assets for internal usage in the system, 
which must be accessed only by 
internal staff. 
 
Negligible Impact: If the 
confidentiality is breached, small 
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or inconsiderable consequences 
will happen for the system.  
 
1 Public Assets 
 
Assets of the system that can be accessed 
by anyone or any service.  
 
Insignificant impact. No 
damages for the System, 
Customer or Organizations.  
 
 
Table 2. Asset’s Rating levels for Integrity 
Integrity 
Level 
 
 
      Title 
 
   Description 
 
Consequence if there would 
be an Integrity failure  
 
 
4 
 High 
 
The assets must not be compromised by 
anyone. 
 
Serious impact: The consequences 
could be catastrophic for the system. 
 
 
3 
   
Medium 
The assets can be compromised by only 
service personnel with privileged or extended 
user rights. 
Significant impact. The 
consequences are major and 
widespread. System errors and 
services breach persist for a 
substantial amount of time.  
 
2 
 
   Low 
The assets can be compromised by internal 
users even if not having any privileged and 
extended user right. 
Minor Impact. The consequences are 
noticeable but workaround can be 
implemented within the system.  
1  
Negligible 
The assets can be compromised by anyone 
even external users. 
Negligible impact. Small or 
inconsiderable consequences which 
will not have noticeable influence on 
the system’s operation. 
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Table 3. Valuation levels for Availability 
AVAILABILITY 
Level 
 
 
  Title 
 
 Description 
 
Consequence of Availability 
deficiency  
 
 
4 
     
Significant  
 
Unavailability is unacceptable. The asset 
fails immediately and cannot be re-
established by a workaround.  
 
High impact on system’s operation, 
which may lead to a complete stop or a 
main impact on the system. Impacts on 
the public image of the system and/or of 
the customer. 
 
3 
   
Major 
A very short period of unavailability can be 
accepted during which assets will be unable 
to provide the intended work.  
Medium impact affects the system 
partially and may lead to a delay in the 
operation of the system. 
 
2 
 
Minor 
 
A short period of unavailability can be 
accepted, assets can be re-established by the 
implementation of alternative procedures. 
Small impact on the operation.  
Small delay with low impact on the 
operation. 
 
1 
Insignificant  Unavailability is acceptable.  
Asset’s continuity is not affected.  
Very-small impact on the operation.  
No direct delay on the system. 
 
5.4.2 Threat Modeling and Selection: Using RMAT software 
Threat modeling and selection step is about preparing a set of appropriate threats and associate 
them to asset classes and organizing them also into classes. Modeling is meant to prepare the 
threats selected; and RMAT software can be used in the modeling. RMAT is a software used 
to prepare elements to the next phases, and in particular to create a threat profile that contains 
the main threats that are probably to affect the current system. Using RMAT, a TSV (Threat 
Standard Values) files could be created using a GUI, a TSV file is a representation for threats. 
Identifying threats for the TSV file is made by associating threats to asset families. The left 
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panel in figure 18 shows the families and the threats associated to each one, while the right 
panel shows the threats and the families associated to each one.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structure of .TSV files that is used to create threat families is: 
 
 
file ::=  
<threat-standard-values>  
{ family }0+  
</threat-standard-values>  
family ::=  
<family F >  
{ threat }0+  
</family>  
threat ::=  
<threat Z f [ s ] >  
{ set }0+  
</threat>  
set ::=  
<set D deg /> 
 
 
After creating the appropriate set of threat families, next is to use it as input to the risk analysis 
study. 
5.4.3 Conducting Risk management study using MAGERIT method 
Following a methodical way in a risk management study is significant in order to obtain an 
efficient study. The objective of Magerit method is to cover both risk analysis and treatment 
for a thorough risk management. MAGERIT is suggested by ENISA which is the European 
Figure 17. Creating TSV file using RMAT  
 
Figure 18. Associating threats to asset classes Using 
RMAT 
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Union Agency for Network and Information Security. MAGERIT is an open methodology for 
Risk Analysis and Management, developed by the Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations. 
The purpose of Magerit is directly related to the generalized use of IT systems, 
communications, and electronic media. This method follows the international concepts as in 
ISO 31000 and ISO/IEC 27005 [28]. Magerit offers a systematic method for analyzing risks, 
and helps in describing and planning the appropriate measures for keeping the risks under 
control. And finally, prepares the organization for the processes of evaluating, auditing, 
certifying or accrediting, as relevant in each case. On the other hand, PILAR software 
implements Magerit method is used to perform its steps. Its GUI (graphical user interface) 
enables the user to execute the MAGERIT method in an understandable and easy way. The 
tool provides fast calculations and generates a quantity of textual and graphical reports.  PILAR 
software has been funded by the Spanish National Security Agency. It is designed to support 
the risk management process along long periods, providing incremental analysis as the 
safeguards improve [29]. PILAR enables the user to create a project, identify the assets for the 
system under study, and generate threats and safeguards and other functionalities. 
 
Figure 19. PILAR software: homepage 
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Furthermore, PILAR can be customized to use TSV files created by RMAT as input for the 
risk management study, so in this case the threats will be selected based on the model created 
before in ”Threat Modeling” step. 
5.4.4 Safeguard implementation 
The safeguard implementation step reflects the “DO” phase of the PDCA, which is putting the 
chosen decisions in the previous treatment plan into operation. At Hitachi Rail STS, the 
Defense in depth (DiD) approach is adopted while implementing safeguards, this approach that 
is based on layering that helps in faster detection and slowing down attacks. In IT 
environments, DiD is intended to increase the costs of an attack against the organization, by 
detecting attacks, allowing time to respond to such attacks, and providing layers of defense so 
that even successful attacks will not fully compromise an organization. A DiD strategy is 
necessary because of the new security threats and the importance of IT security monitoring of 
assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 20. Layering: Defense in Depth 
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5.4.5 Vulnerability assessment for cyber assets: 
The cyber side of a CPS contains various set of assets such as network appliances, servers, 
software, web applications, databases, etc. At Hitachi Rail STS, vulnerability assessment is 
applied basically on 3 levels: network, application, and operating system levels. 
 Network Vulnerability assessment: Network scanners are useful to analyze the 
network, and hosts on the network to detect vulnerabilities. Nmap (Network Mapper) 
is a security scanner used on this level to discover hosts and services on a computer 
network, thus building a "map" of the network. Nmap features include host discovery, 
port scanning, OS detection, in preparation for auditing, which all help in finding 
and exploiting vulnerabilities in the network. 
 
 Web application vulnerability assessment: Using automated web application and 
web services vulnerability scanning solutions to apply attack algorithms and determine 
the existence and relative severity of vulnerabilities. Some dedicated tools employ an 
extensive arsenal of attack agents designed to detect security flaws in web-based 
applications. It probes the system with thousands of HTTP requests and evaluates each 
individual response. This assessment detects vulnerabilities, pinpoints their location in 
the application, and recommends corrective actions.  
 
 OS Vulnerability Assessment: On the level of operating system, what is meant is to 
apply host vulnerability assessment through scanning specific hosts. This allows the 
administrators to go beyond testing for known network vulnerabilities, but also 
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examining more vulnerabilities such as patch levels, check OS configuration, and 
installed software on computers running operating system.  
5.4.6 Compliance:  
Compliance can be oriented to internal policies and rules or to external laws and regulations, 
but in any case it represents a fundamental step in order to maintain the organization control 
inside its specific regulatory environment. PILAR software can be also used to conduct this 
step by using a security profile that is a description for a list of policies that a system would 
comply to. It is a collection of safeguards that aim to protect a system. Security profiles may 
focus on some specific aspects, or may be general. The use of a security profile in a project is 
basically to check and ensure compliance. It is also possible to create custom security profiles, 
and some are widely known e.g.: ISO/IEC 27002. PILAR maps security profiles to its 
safeguards in such a way to estimate to which extent the system is compliant. 
 
Figure 21. Applying security profiles in the compliance step 
 
After loading a security profile into the project, the goal is to evaluate its set of controls based 
on the safeguards, to check the compliance of the system to this security profile. The aim is to 
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focus on the formal compliance to some security standard could be reviewed during the “Audit” 
phase. 
5.4.7 Maintenance and Improvement: 
At the end, after executing all the steps of the framework, it is critical to monitor and observe 
if the taken decisions were effective, and if there is a need for maintenance or improvement or 
even adding a missed measure. On the other hand, in some situations it could be necessary to 
reduce the cost of a certain countermeasure. Using PILAR, in the PLAN phase, the “current” 
stage represents the current state of the system, and “target” stage represents the goal to reach 
(Fig. 22). However, now in the “ACT” phase, a new target (Fig. 23) will represent the new 
goal to achieve based on the new observations and analysis done, and putting all safeguards 
into operation. The system is monitored and a set of investigation and observations is done to 
apply the refinement in case it requires.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. New Safeguards values in ACT phase 
Figure 22. Safeguards values in PLAN phase 
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In recent years, we have seen a growth in the development of various types of Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPS). They have brought impacts to almost all aspects of our daily life. Many of 
such systems are deployed in the critical infrastructure, and so, they are exposed to different 
types of attacks. In this chapter, a holistic framework is proposed from Hitachi Rail STS’s point 
of view that breaks the restriction to a traditional risk assessment method, and encompasses 
wider set of procedures which can be followed in any risk mangement study for the CPSs. 
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6 Chapter six: Guidelines to select an applicable SIEM solution 
This chapter discusses how to select a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
that is most applicable inside a company. It was conducted during the phase Hitachi Rail STS 
was searching for a suitable SIEM. The work was concluded by proposing an approach that 
can be followed by organizations trying to do a similar job. This part of the work can be defined 
as a procedure that falls at the end inside the ISMS. 
 
Figure 24. PhD goals (related to the ISMS): The guidelines to select an applicable SIEM 
  
 The need for Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems increased in the 
last years. Many companies seek to reinforce their security capabilities to better safeguard 
against cybersecurity threats, so they adopt multi-layered security strategies that include using 
a SIEM solution. However, implementing a SIEM solution is not just an installation phase that 
fits any scenario within any organization; the best SIEM system for an organization may not 
be suitable at all for another one. An organization should consider other factors along with the 
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technical side when evaluating a SIEM solution. This chapters describes an approach proposed 
to aid enterprises, in selecting an applicable SIEM solution. 
Information and communication technology (ICT) has made a remarkable impact on the 
society. Companies nowadays rely on information and communication technology which puts 
their assets under certain risks especially cyber ones, hence they must be kept under control by 
means of security countermeasures that generate confidence in the use of these assets [9]. 
Companies all over the world need to ensure valuable assets, uninterrupted business operation 
(processes), reliable data and quality of service (QoS) to various groups of users [30]. They 
need to protect their clients and employees both inside and outside the organization [31]. 
According to Gartner, by 2020, 30% of global enterprises will have been directly compromised 
by an independent group of cybercriminals or cyber activists. Moreover, in 60% of network 
breaches, hackers compromise the network within minutes [32]. On the other hand, companies’ 
IT environment is getting more complex, involving many security appliances that may 
contribute to security strategy in business processes. Therefore, organizations started to invest 
on integrating SIEMs (Security Information and Event Management) to improve their security.  
The term SIEM was introduced by Gartner in 2005. The SIEM system has replaced two types 
of systems before separated – Security Information Management (SIM) and Security Event 
Management (SEM) systems [33]. The former provided long-term storage, analysis and 
reporting, while the latter collected events in real time. Their combination yearned for near 
real-time analysis, to send notifications and represent information at an operator’s console in 
charge for taking defensive actions. Overall, SIEM system combines SIM and SEM 
functionalities into one security management system, which collects and correlates relevant 
data from multiple sources, outputs reports, identifies deviations and takes appropriate actions. 
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For example, when a potential issue is detected, SIEM might log it as a new information, 
generate an alert and instruct other security controls to stop any activity progress. Gartner 
estimates the SIEM market will grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.5% 
between 2016 and 2022, and the worldwide spending on SIEM will reach 3.72 billion dollars 
[34]. 
From an organization perspective, the challenge is not just about selecting any SIEM solution 
but implementing the right solution that fits better within company structure and is aligned with 
the existing threats landscape. In addition, it must be flexible enough to be easily adapted to 
meet any changes thereafter. Security and risk management (SRM) leaders evaluating SIEM 
solutions must understand their use cases and then define specific requirements in conjunction 
with applicable stakeholders and company strategy in general [35]. 
On the other hand, organizations must require a structured approach for managing their 
challenges. This will ensure that there are agreed objectives, good management controls in 
place and effective monitoring of performance to keep on track and avoid unexpected 
outcomes.  Therefore, this chapter proposes not just technological but pragmatic approach to 
support companies that are seeking to adopt SIEM systems into their environments, suggesting 
suitable answers to preferred requirements that are believed to be valuable prerequisites a SIEM 
system should have. The aim of the proposed approach is to advice a pre-installation strategy, 
a way to evaluate functional components that a SIEM should comprise in terms of both 
technical and organizational requirements, and to suggest criteria to judge SIEM systems using 
an evaluation process composed of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
However, and because of the complexity, precision and thoroughness required to apply our 
whole approach, it is mainly dedicated to large enterprises, which include wide variety of broad 
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and specific skills and several specialists to manage certain applications or parts of the IT 
infrastructure, and most of them comprise a dedicated department to manage information 
security. Therefore, this approach can be followed by those bigger enterprises that in general 
tend to manage their work in a very structured manner, they need to assert successful 
management and performance, and this is our goal, to aid in following a thorough approach for 
the issue. This work represents the first and primary phase in the procedure of choosing a SIEM 
or a set of qualified SIEMs, however, it has to be followed by a testing phase that enable the 
customer to check the solution directly after the installation. 
6.1 Backgrounds and related works 
6.1.1 SIEM system: Definitions 
There is a plethora of features regarding SIEM systems, which are developed differently by 
each vendor.  In general, SIEM collects, normalizes and aggregates event data produced by 
security devices, network infrastructure, systems, and applications. Event data is combined with 
contextual information about users, assets, threats and vulnerabilities. SIEM systems could be 
agentless and agent based [36] [37], or even hybrid (using both agent and agentless) and may 
adopt new technologies such as HEC (Http Event Collection). Agentless means that the log-
source transmits its logs to the SIEM, or an intermediate logging server involved, such as a 
syslog server; while agent-based means that an agent is installed on a source-log to gather 
security events from the endpoint itself. Today, most SIEM systems work deploying multiple 
collection agents (collectors) in a hierarchical manner. Log collectors forward events to a 
centralized management console, which performs inspections and flags anomalies [31]. Then 
after collection, the data should be normalized so it can be correlated and analysed. Another 
feature is the pre-filtering that is related to processing centre, some systems use a pre-processing 
mechanism at the edge collectors, with only certain events being passed through to a centralized 
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management node. In this way, the volume of information being communicated and stored can 
be reduced.  
 SIEM technology provides near real-time correlation of events for security monitoring, 
query and analytics for historical analysis and other support for incident investigation, 
compliance reporting, and alerting [38]. According to Gartner, by 2020, 75% of all SIEM 
solutions will use big data technologies at their core, along with machine learning, to improve 
threat detection and response capabilities [35]. In short, there are so many SIEM systems in the 
market created by skilled and expert security vendors with their own features, however, 
selecting the suitable SIEM is not a trivial task anymore: it is not simply about installing the 
most powerful one, for instance, a very powerful SIEM may be too complex to apply in some 
cases. 
6.1.2 Related works 
Several studies were conducted in the field of “How to select a SIEM system”. Gartner 
reports are an excellent example where they present a detailed evaluation of the current SIEM 
products based on many characteristics such as sales execution, pricing, costumer experience, 
marketing message evaluation against the understanding of customer needs [35] [38] [39]. In 
[38], the authors examined different SIEM products that are the leaders of SIEM technology, 
they focused on technical requirements and showed strengths and cautions for each vendor and 
at the end they defined evaluation criteria from an ability-to-execute point of view. According 
to [35], the analysts defined a list of critical capabilities that a SIEM should include and 
suggested three different and general use cases: Basic Security Monitoring, Complex Security 
Monitoring, Advanced Threat Defence. They used an evaluation criterion to evaluate the most 
powerful SIEM products available, which is based on the defined critical capabilities and the 
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three suggested scenarios. In [40], SANS Institute provided environment-specific criteria to 
benchmark SIEM solutions, where organizations should consider factors like Events-Per-
Second (EPS), considering the number of employees in each sub-net, number of databases, and 
the ability to store and analyze these events, in order to evaluate and even design a SIEM system. 
In [41], Nabil et al. proposed an after-installation evaluation approach: such an approach may 
be time-consuming for companies, and it should be preceded by a PRE-installation evaluation 
approach that qualifies and select the applicable SIEMs from the plethora of solutions available 
before installing them.  
The common point between the above-defined related-work is that all of them are product 
driven, where the evaluation of the solution is for the product as a technical solution. However, 
our approach is customer driven, where the selection phase is not only based on the technical 
features of the product but also subject to pre-defined customer’s needs.  
6.2 Aspects to be addressed before adopting a SIEM solution 
Before starting the procedure of choosing a SIEM, it is essential to consider some general 
aspects that could influence the technical and the organizational evaluation of the solution. 
Companies must understand completely the problems they are trying to solve, considering 
aspects such as company type, its assets, what to secure, internal policies and external 
regulations. 
 To select an appropriate SIEM, the customer should prepare a list of requirements to 
describe the needs sought in the SIEM, usually described in a request-for-proposal (RFP) 
document. However, before defining those requirements, some general aspects that affect the 
SIEM selection should be examined, and SRM leaders must include at least the following 
considerations as a first step:  
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 The company: 
Companies may differ by vertical, size, location, and other factors that may affect SRM 
leaders’ decisions.  Each company has its own information system and architecture, some 
companies could be geographically distributed, require high availability services and may 
generate enormous amount of logs with different formats. 
 Prioritizing assets and risks: 
It is necessary to conduct an overall study to identify and evaluate the most critical assets and 
their corresponding risks in order to specify the most important targets of the monitoring and 
defensive activities of the SIEM system. The goal is to identify odds and costs if something 
wretched happened. Prioritizing risks helps in selecting what logs are more important, to give 
them high priority when configuring the SIEM for more efficient correlation and reporting. 
 Compliance, regulations and forensics capability: 
The company might be impacted by internal or external regulations. Compliance could be 
like conforming to international standards, or internal policies.  For example, in some cases, it 
may be necessary to keep log-collectors on site to secure data in the place of origin, based on a 
specific state or country regulation, hence the entire deployment will be affected with such 
regulations, and so they should be considered. On the other hand, forensics should be addressed 
from two sides, the first is about ensuring, once collected, the logs were not altered and their 
integrity were preserved, the other side of forensics is that the SIEM should support incident 
management and investigation activities. 
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 Security Operation Center: 
One essential aspect is about who will own, maintain and operate this new technology. SOC 
(Security Operation Center) is a centralized unit that deals with security issues on an 
organizational level made up of a team primarily composed of security analysts (and operators) 
organized to detect, analyse, respond to, report on, and prevent security incidents in order to 
minimize risks [37]. This choice is part of a more general view oriented to the integration into 
company IT environment and effort needed to maintain such a system during license lifetime. 
And so, in the selection of a SIEM, the responsible should be aware of who will operate the 
SIEM, and if they can operate the selected SIEM platform or by considering the training costs. 
 Human and technological aspects: 
Finally, an important aspect that should be also considered is to gather feedback from inside 
the organization about the IT resources and capabilities to support a specific SIEM product and 
potentially overlapping technologies in order to release IT means and personnel and skills to be 
allocated in this activity. Moreover, the organization should be aware about how the selected 
platform must be easily integrated in the technology environment of the company. 
6.3 A SIEM selection approach: Requirements and Evaluation 
What characterizes this work is that it proposes an overall approach for the problem of 
selecting the applicable SIEM solution, and searching the previous work will show how few, if 
no similar comprehensive approaches were proposed. Some of the work done focused just on 
the technical requirements without addressing the organizational ones, and other aspects. Others 
did not consider the problem of applicability or integration in the environment. This approach, 
unlike others, is customer driven which means that customer needs are taken into account when 
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following the whole approach, specifically when defining the requirements and then evaluating 
the suppliers’ solutions. 
Saving time, using a systematic-organized strategy for decision-making and balancing costs 
to needs are the main advantages of adopting such an approach. This approach starts by 
suggesting the requirements (technical and organizational) that should be addressed in a SIEM 
solution in a systematic way , and then proposes a methodology for evaluating SIEM solutions 
that measures the compliance and applicability of any SIEM solution using quantitative and 
qualitative methods. This evaluation methodology is split into two phases: 
(1) Quantifying each requirement of the received SIEM solution using a quantitative based 
method; 
(2) Measuring the applicability of the solution using a qualitative based method after 
defining a list of indicators that enables the evaluation of this applicability. 
The goal is to select the appropriate SIEM that fits best in company’s environment and 
resources; however, we stress that a final installation-testing phase must be accomplished with 
the suppliers to make sure about the compliance of the selected solution to the needs addressed.  
6.3.1 Technical and organizational SIEM requirements: 
Defining requirements is an important task; it helps the companies to define their needs, be 
aware of any shortage, and aids them in the evaluation phase. Information security and risk 
management leaders responsible for security operations should focus their evaluation on the 
critical capabilities that align with their use cases, requirements, and current and future IT 
environments, e.g. on-premises versus cloud-based services [35]. 
This section groups the requirements needed to adopt a SIEM platform covering in detail the 
“mandatory” and “nice-to-have” requirements, as listed in Table 4.  
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Those requirements represent the needs of the customer, they cover all the features and services 
that the supplier should include when proposing a SIEM solution. 
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Table 4. SIEM requirements 
Section Type Requirement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Platform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory 
1. Log Management System 
capability 
2. Supporting an extended set of log 
sources 
3. Customization of 
parsers/connectors 
4. Method for retrieving 
events/flows/logs 
5. Specification of the method for 
retrieving events/flows/logs 
6. Hierarchical and modular/scalable 
architecture 
7. Time-zones management 
8. Platform computing capacity 
9. Platform storage capacity 
10. Installation model 
11. High Availability/caching options 
12. Availability of both default and 
customizable correlation rules 
13. Dashboard features: ability to 
quickly prioritize response and 
analysis 
14. Customizable and compliance 
reports 
15. Alerting capabilities 
16. Technical documentation and 
online help 
17. Ability of Monitoring the platform 
18. Secure Software 
19. Context enrichment based on 
collected logs 
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20. Support for collection of real-time 
and deferred logs 
 
 
Nice to 
have 
21. Multi-tenant capabilities (views) 
22. Anonymization of logs 
23. Support MITRE ATT&CK 
correlation matrix 
Operations 
 
Mandatory 
1. Role-based access control 
2. Accounting: log events done by 
operators 
3. Web interface for day-by-day 
operation 
 
Nice to 
have 
4. Customizable time-zones for the 
GUI 
Integration Mandatory 
1. Active Directory integration for 
administrative management 
 
 
Nice to 
have 
2. Integration with asset 
management tools 
3. Case Management and trouble-
ticketing activities tracking 
4. Trouble ticketing module 
5. Integration with vulnerability 
management tools 
Advanced 
features 
 
Nice to 
have 
1. Threat Intelligence analysis tools 
support 
2. Support for forensics analysis 
activities 
3. Analytics support 
4. Automatic response capabilities 
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Licensing and 
support 
Mandatory 
1. Specification of the preferred 
License type 
2. Licensing restrictions 
3. Specification of the project 
Roadmap 
4. Delayed license activation 
5. Technical assistance support and 
professional services 
6. Training provided 
 
Requirements are divided into 5 sections: platform, operations, integration, advanced features 
and licensing-support services. 
a. Platform: Describes the technical requirements needed in the platform. 
b. Operations: Groups the requirements needed to manage the solution. 
c. Integration: This section groups the requirements needed to integrate the SIEM solution 
into the Company’s information system. 
d. Advanced features: This section describes the advanced features, they could be considered 
as nice-to-have requirements. 
e. Licensing and support: This section lists and describes the licensing and support services 
requirement. 
6.3.2 Measuring the compliance and applicability of a SIEM: An evaluation process 
Evaluation is the structured interpretation and giving of meaning to predicted or actual 
impacts of proposals or results. It looks at original objectives, and at what is either predicted or 
what was accomplished and how it was accomplished [42]. It can assist an organization to assess 
and help in decision-making; or to ascertain the degree of achievement or value about the aim 
and objectives and results of any action. Evaluation is methodologically diverse; two types of 
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methods may be qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative methods are distinguished by emphasis 
on numbers, measurement, experimental design, and statistical analysis [43], and hopes the 
numbers will yield an unbiased result that can be generalized to some larger population. 
However, qualitative methods evaluate other parameters such the success and the eligibility of 
a product in a specific environment using non-numerical (textual forms) data to assess the 
eligibility and reliability of adopting the solution, such as the use of internal discussions, 
interviews, comparisons to provide feedbacks, etc. Both quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
methods have their benefits, quantitative evaluation can help remove human bias, thus more 
accurate. However, qualitative evaluations may also involve truths, but these truths are harder 
to get at, and evaluators may not always agree. In our approach, an evaluation process is 
proposed; it is applied after receiving the description of the SIEM solution from suppliers. It is 
divided into two methods: quantitative and qualitative. The first method “Requirements-based 
Evaluation” is the quantitative side of the evaluation process; it evaluates the degree of 
compliance for each requirement of the received SIEM solution using numerical values and 
mathematical operations.  This method is applied to the SIEM solutions that might be adopted 
and used to obtain a list of qualified ones as an output. After that, the output of this method is 
then provided as input to the second method .                   
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Figure 25.  How to apply the overall approach 
 
On the other hand, the second method “Applicability Evaluation” represents the qualitative 
side of this evaluation process, it focuses on the observations, interpretation and the opinion of 
the concerned parties, rather than going into measuring the value of each requirement of the 
received SIEM solution. Both methods are complementary in the evaluation process, using 
both helps in getting a deeper understanding and obtaining a precise and flexible evaluation. 
The quantitative side represents the accuracy that evaluates and qualify a set of SIEMs, 
however the qualitative side represents the flexibility, where the evaluators add their analysis, 
opinion and understanding to compare the qualified solutions and finally to select the most 
applicable one. Figure 25 shows how to apply the approach starting by defining the 
requirements that the customer seeks in their SIEM product, then evaluating the received ones 
using the proposed evaluation process described in the next section. 
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6.3.2.1  Compliance measurement: A quantitative requirement-based evaluation method 
The first evaluation method measures the degree of compliance of each requirement in the 
SIEM solution that might be adopted, it is a first step evaluation. After receiving the tenders 
from diverse suppliers proposing a SIEM solution, security and risk management (SRM) leaders 
evaluate each SIEM solution separately, where each requirement is evaluated to get a total score 
for the whole solution. Two different parameters are assigned to each and they are the 
requirement value (V) and the weight (W). The requirement value is the grade assigned to 
evaluate the answer-to-requirement in the under-evaluation SIEM solution, while the weight 
represents the importance of current requirement in the solution from the user point of view, 
and is assigned initially when the customer defines his requirements, for example, a mandatory 
requirement has a high value compared to nice-to-have ones. And then, a score (S) is calculated 
for each requirement (S = V*W), and after that a total for each requirement section is computed. 
Finally, the total score is obtained by adding all the totals corresponding the requirements family 
sections. Table 5 is an example to use in applying this evaluation method.  
For a better evaluation, a scale is suggested to represent the requirement value (V). This scale 
is used to differentiate between an insufficient, good, very good, and excellent requirement 
proposed by the supplier, by translating the level of compliance of the under-evaluation 
requirement into a numerical value. A non-linear growth scale is suggested to be used because 
of its ability to differentiate between the values using the high growth rate. 
At the end, evaluators may define a passing grade to use to select the qualified “under-
evaluation SIEM solutions, so they can directly reject a solution with lower total score. The 
output of this method should be several accepted SIEM solutions which all complied the defined 
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requirements, but at the end one solution should be adopted, and this is the role of the second 
evaluation method, which examines the applicability. 
 
Table 5. Requirement-based Evaluation 
SIEM X Requirement 
Requirement 
Value(V) 
Weight
(W) 
Score(s) Total 
PLATFORM 
a1 
. 
. 
a23 
V(a1) 
. 
. 
V(a23) 
W(a1) 
. 
. 
W(a23) 
V(a1)*W(a1) 
. 
. 
Va23*Wa23 
∑𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝑊(𝑎𝑖)
23
𝑖=1
 
OPERATIONS 
b1 
. 
. 
b4 
V(b1) 
. 
. 
V(b4) 
W(b1) 
. 
. 
W(b4) 
V(b1)*W(b1) 
. 
. 
V(b4)*W(b4) 
∑𝑉(𝑏𝑖) ∗ 𝑊(𝑏𝑖)
4
𝑖=1
 
INTEGRATIONS 
c1 
. 
. 
. 
c5 
V(c1) 
. 
. 
. 
V(c5) 
W(c1) 
. 
. 
. 
W(c5) 
V(c1)* W(c1) 
. 
. 
. 
V(c5)*W(c5) 
∑𝑉(𝑐𝑖) ∗ 𝑊(𝑐𝑖
5
𝑖=1
) 
ADVANCED 
FEATURES 
d1 
. 
. 
. 
d4 
Vd1 
. 
. 
. 
Vd4 
Wd1 
. 
. 
. 
Wd4 
. 
. 
. 
 
∑𝑉(𝑑𝑖) ∗ 𝑊(𝑑𝑖)
4
𝑖=1
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LICENSING AND 
SUPPORT 
e1 
. 
. 
e6 
Ve1 
. 
. 
Ve6 
. 
. 
. 
 
. 
. 
. 
∑𝑣(𝑒𝑖) ∗ 𝑤(𝑒𝑖)
6
𝑖=1
 
TOTAL SCORE ∑: Total 
6.3.2.2 Applicability evaluation: A qualitative method 
Security and risk management leaders increasingly seek SIEM solutions with capabilities that 
support early targeted attack detection and response. Users must balance advanced SIEM 
capabilities with the resources needed to run and tune the solution [38]. The best SIEM system 
for an organization may not be suitable at all for another. Other variations should be considered 
along with the technical side when evaluating a SIEM solution. Therefore, the qualitative side 
of the approach takes place; it is about examining the whole solution in terms of applicability 
rather than measuring mathematically the value of each requirement. The highest-grade 
solution is not always the choice, it may have powerful features, but too complex to install, or 
even too expensive. This method aims to evaluate the qualified SIEM solutions in a high-level 
manner.  It does not aim to evaluate technically each solution, however, to examine the 
applicability of them. In such method, a unified scale is followed, and a set of Indicators is 
used to evaluate and compare, without going deeply into technical details as in the requirement-
based evaluation. Weight, evaluation, notes are other parameters used, and described next. 
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INDICATORS: 
Indicators are grouped into families, and have different weights (high, medium, and low), 
where some are key factors in the selection process more than others are. They help adequately 
evaluate technology solution vendors and then decide which solution fits better. 
 
a. The PLATFORM 
The “platform” family-of-indicators tries to assess the applicability of the proposed solution. 
This section encompasses the following list of indicators and should be considered important. 
 Compliance: the compliance indicator represents to what extent is the proposed solution 
compliant. In other words, it evaluates the compliance of the mandatory requirements 
or the existence of non-compliant requirements, taking into account the restrictions, 
constraints, regulations or policies that prevent the implementation of such solution: e.g., 
kind of the solution proposed: software/hardware.  
 Quality of services: a general evaluation for the quality of the services, capabilities that 
the solution offers. 
 Robust Architecture: evaluates the proposed architecture of the solution, the 
deployment, and if this architecture preserves a high availability. 
 Scalability: evaluates the ease and the ability of the solution to grow, in terms of adding 
additional features in the future, e.g.: adding additional licenses, etc. 
 Complexity of the solution: this indicator evaluates the applicability of the platform 
(platform kind, number of nodes, etc.), ease of deployment, level of integration, 
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relevance. For instance, the user does not need to modify or develop something hard to 
integrate the solution. 
 Clearness: evaluates the clearness of description of the SIEM solution (e.g. Does the 
received RFP include a complete description or is there something ambiguous?). 
b. Licensing and support Services 
 Duration:  Evaluation of the planned duration by the supplier to install the solution (e.g. 
Does it have a clear roadmap). 
 Licensing:  Evaluates the type of the licensing offered by the supplier (license or other 
purchase options, e.g. leasing), and evaluates if the activation starts after the end of the 
acceptance tests in which all the project requirements will be met. 
 The support: Evaluation for the availability of the technical support (e.g. 7 days/week 
and 24h/24h). 
 Training: evaluates the training level provided. 
c. Advanced features: 
 Support additional features: Evaluation of the available advanced features or 
additional ones. 
 Integration with third parties: Evaluates how much the solution can be integrated with 
3rd  party tools, or just restricted or limited. 
d. Other Indicators 
 Skill of the supplier/vendor: Examines if the supplier or vendor has the expertise in 
this field, and the services that it offers. 
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 The price: Represents an important indicator in the selection process and a cost-
effective option should be selected. 
WEIGHT: 
It corresponds to the weight of the indicator that will be evaluated; the weight in terms of its 
relative importance in the whole solution, weight could take different values such as high, 
medium or low. It is up to the evaluator to assign those values based on their own needs and 
addressing related aspects. 
EVALUATION: 
An evaluation is defined for each indicator. The evaluation is carried out based on the eligibility 
and reliability. Values could be insufficient, good, very good, and excellent. 
NOTES: 
It could be the team’s general conclusion drawn up based on the described solution in each 
tender. It represent additional notes, which the evaluator considers that should be highlighted. 
 
Table 6. Applicability Evaluation for each SIEM solution 
SIEM X Indicators 
Importance or 
weight 
Evaluation NOTES 
Applicability 
Level of Compliance …… …… …… 
Complexity …… …… …… 
Quality of services/ 
capabilities 
…… …… 
…… 
Robust Architecture  …… …… …… 
Scalability …… …… …… 
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Clearness/ complete 
description 
…… …… …… 
Licensing and 
support services 
Installation duration/ 
clearness of road map 
…… …… …… 
Licensing …… …… …… 
Support …… …… …… 
Training …… …… …… 
Advanced Features 
Additional features …… …… …… 
Integration with third 
parties 
…… …… …… 
Other indicators 
Expertise/Skill of Vendor/ 
Supplier 
…… …… …… 
Price …… …… …… 
OVERALL 
RESULT 
ACCEPTED 
or 
REJECTED 
 
Table 6 shows a model (table-form) to use in applying this proposed method in an easy way. 
At the end, the suggested indicators may intersect or overlap, so the evaluators may merge 
some together or even split others. On the other hand, each organization may assign a different 
weight for those indicators based on the requirements they need, policies, regulations, etc. 
6.4 Case study: Applying the approach 
The approach presented in this work was applied at Hitachi Rail STS Company [24]. To select 
a SIEM solution, the Company believes that a structured and systematic procedure should be 
followed, in an organized manner, which is the way Hitachi Rail STS tends to manage its 
challenges, i.e. ensuring that there are agreed objectives, good management controls in place 
to keep on track and avoid unexpected outcomes. Another main reason for selecting and 
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adopting such an approach is to provide enhanced compliance and requirements coverage in 
bids. 
6.4.1 Creating a Request-For-Proposal (RFP): Specifying SIEM requirements 
Specifying requirements is the first step while applying this approach. Therefore, a request-
for-proposal (RPF) document (containing all the requirements that are believed to be 
mandatory or nice-to-have in the SIEM quest) was prepared and inspired by the SIEM 
requirement section of this approach, extending and describing briefly each requirement, to 
make the suppliers aware of the features that their solution should have to fit the customer 
needs. Following the approach proposed, requirements are divided into 5 sections: platform, 
operations, integration, advanced features and licensing-support services. The RFP sent to the 
suppliers: 
a. Platform. Describes the technical requirements needed in the platform. 
1. Log Management System capability: The technical solution must address the 
collection, hashing, normalization, indexing, compression plus archiving, retention, 
(and all usual Log Management Systems' features) of events and log files along with 
aggregation, correlation, analysis, reporting and alerting. The platform should be 
easily integrated with the most widespread log management or SIEM solutions. 
2. SIEM platform kind: The supplier should provide details about the kind of SIEM 
platform available (for example hardware appliances or virtual appliances, or 
software only), where hardware is preferred in our case.  
3. Supporting an extended set of log sources: The platform must be able to parse 
with native support the most widespread log sources. A list of the mandatory ones 
must be listed.   
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4. Customization of parsers/connectors: The platform should be able to support the 
creation of a library of customized parsers/connectors. 
5. Method for retrieving events/flows/logs: Specification of the method used for 
retrieving events/flows/logs (by agent/agentless support): the customer must be 
aware about the relevant method that fits the case, and the supplier should describe 
his proposed one clearing why the selected method is better. 
6. Hierarchical and modular/scalable architecture: The architecture should be 
scalable featured by unlocking license or adding modules, without the need of 
replacement and reconfiguration. Additional value if regional-based hierarchy is 
supported, with local collection and caching at main nodes and intelligent 
correlation at a central post. 
7. Time-zones management: The SIEM architecture must support many different 
time-zone management capabilities, even up to providing time-zones when 
capturing log files which have none. 
8. Platform computing capacity: The calculation to determine the appropriate 
number of sustained EPS and the EPS peak value proposed, should all be stated. 
Such parameter must be conveniently increased to support events storm in peak 
situations. 
9. Platform storage capacity: The platform must be able to store the events/logs for 
an agreed period of time (e.g.: in months) for a quick indexed access and for a long-
term storage. 
10. Installation model: The supplier should specify what installation model is 
available (e.g. on premise, private cloud or managed option). 
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11. High Availability/caching options: The redundancy/caching options should be 
available to avoid event/log file transfer losses in case of the distributed installation. 
Additional value if load balancing is possible among remote nodes while sustaining 
the same number of EPS. 
12. Availability of both default and customizable correlation rules: The platform 
should include a set of standard correlation rules scenarios, and must be able to 
design further correlations rules. 
13. Dashboard features: The dashboard should be able to quickly prioritize response 
and analysis (e.g.: multiple drill-down, elastic search, customizable dashboards per 
user, default views) 
14. Customizable and compliance reports: The supplier should provide details about 
the availability out of the box of compliance reports (e.g., ISO27001, SOX, NERC, 
Top 20 CSC, Privacy, etc.) and the generation of customizable ones. 
15. Alerting capabilities: Capability of triggering alerts, e.g. sending a notification 
message or email, and so to respond to incidents. 
16. Technical documentation and online help: Availability of technical 
documentation, both with offline and online help (E.G. available wizards, recipes, 
etc). 
17. Monitoring: The SIEM platform should be monitored using any standard protocol 
(e.g.: SNMP) so the it can be added in the Company’s monitoring platform. 
18. Secure Software: The supplier should state the SIEM platform operating system 
and version along with the “secure by design” techniques adopted. 
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19. Context enrichment based on collected logs: Availability of correlation rules to 
gather and merge information from the different  log sources, to be able to provide 
all the info of the array [Mac, IP, hostname, username] whenever available 
somewhere in the logs.  
20. Support for collection of real-time and deferred logs: The supplier should 
provide details about the support, normalization and indexing of logs retrieved in 
real-time and deferred way (e.g. sent by batch jobs). 
21. Multi-tenant capabilities (views): The supplier should provide details about the 
SIEM solution capability to display some views based on connector grouping (e.g., 
connectors associated to different geographical entities or based upon management 
responsibilities like systems, DBs, network or security devices). 
22. Anonymization of logs, e.g. for GDPR compliance: Provide details about 
anonymization of logs (e.g., by at least masquerading privacy-related info to some 
profiles of users). 
23. Support MITRE ATT&CK correlation matrix: Provide details about the support 
of TTP use detection of MITRE ATT&CK matrix. 
b. Operations. Groups the requirements needed to manage the solution. 
1. Role-based access control: The platform has to implement a role based access 
control mechanism suitable by the configuration of multiple user profiles owning 
different privileges to implement the accountability and separation of duties 
principles. 
2. Accounting: The SIEM platform must have an audit log facility in order to track 
the activity relevant from the security perspective performed by operators. 
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3. Web interface for day-by-day operation: The SIEM platform interface used by 
users for daily analysis has to be web-based. 
4. Customizable time-zones for the GUI: The interface must allow the user to 
choose in which time zone all the data must be displayed. 
 
c. Integration. This section groups the requirements needed to integrate the SIEM solution 
into the Company’s information system. 
1. Active Directory integration for administrative management: The platform 
access must be granted only to qualified users authenticated and authorized via the 
Company’s Active Directory database. 
2. Integration with asset management tools: The ability to integrate the solution 
with asset management standard tools (E.g. Configuration Management Data 
Base). 
3. Case Management and trouble-ticketing activities tracking: The ability to 
manage incident handling issues and the conditional support of standard IT trouble 
ticketing systems (workflows, prioritization, KB email exchange). 
4. Trouble ticketing module: The supplier should provide details in case of the 
availability of a trouble ticketing system with the SIEM. 
5. Integration with vulnerability management tools: A nice feature is the ability to 
integrate with vulnerability management tools. 
 
d. Advanced features. This section describes the advanced features, they could be considered 
as nice-to-have requirements. 
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1. Threat Intelligence analysis tools support: Availability of threat analysis tools is 
a plus if already available by the vendor and by using standard formats for exchange 
such as: STIX, TAXII, IoC, other standard formats. 
2. Support for forensics analysis activities: Additional value if forensics analysis 
activities are available (file integrity monitoring, pcaps, NetFlow, evidence 
acquisition). 
3. Analytics support: Additional value if there is a support for anomaly detection, 
use and entity behavioral profiling. 
4. Automatic response capabilities: Additional value if there is a support for 
automatic response capabilities (e.g. SOAR: security orchestration automatic 
response). 
e. Licensing and support: This section lists and describes the licensing and support services 
requirement. 
1. Preferred License type: The supplier should specify if the SIEM solution would 
be available only by license or also in other purchase option, e.g. such as leasing. 
2. Licensing restrictions: State any license limitations, for example what happens in 
case of exceeding the limits mentioned in license.  
3. Project Roadmap: Describe the tasks involved with the project of the SIEM 
platform installation and configuration and the corresponding timeframes. 
4. Delayed license activation: The license activation should start only after the end 
of the acceptance tests in which all the project requirements will be met. The 
customer must ask for an acceptance-testing period to verify that the solution 
complies with the received description. 
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5.  Technical assistance support and professional services: The supplier should 
include a description of the including technical support and professional services 
provided/available by vendor/system integrator. 
6. Training provided: A description of training package should be provided. 
6.4.2 Evaluating the received SIEM solutions  
Different solutions were proposed by a set of suppliers according to their expertise in the field 
and using the most powerful SIEM products available in the market nowadays. However, in 
this case study, only four solutions are selected to apply the proposed approach, which are 
believed to be enough for showing and verifying the efficiency and effectiveness of our 
approach. But, for the purpose of not being subjective or promoting a solution, the study will 
not mention any supplier or SIEM product name, and instead it will anonymize their names 
and use the following notation for them: 
(1) Supplier 1 using product X  
(2) Supplier 2 using Product Y  
(3) Supplier 3 using Product Z   
(4) Supplier 4 using Product T  
Where the “supplier” is the one who provided the whole SIEM solution (product, architecture, 
installation, licenses, training, etc.) and the “product” is the name of the innovator who created 
the SIEM product. 
After receiving the tenders from the suppliers, describing their overall solutions, the next step 
in the approach is to apply the evaluation phase. Evaluation is divided into two methods, 
requirements-based (quantitative) and applicability-based (qualitative), where the first aims to 
qualify a set of the best in terms of matching and complying the requirements specified by the 
customer, and the latter aims to select only one solution that best fits the company. 
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IT security and risk management leaders responsible for security operations should focus their 
evaluation on the critical capabilities of the SIEM that align with their use cases, requirements, 
and current and future IT environments [39], therefore it is not just about selecting the best 
SIEM in the market. 
And so, the evaluation done next is based on the whole solution offered, which includes the 
proposed architecture (topology for installation and deployment), kind of the platform, 
complexity, technical features, licensing, etc…, and it is not only an evaluation for the tool or 
the vendor that develops it.  Again, the evaluation applied using this approach is from a 
customer point of view, ensuring the selection of the most appropriate and applicable solution 
based on the needs and context. 
6.4.2.1 Requirement-based evaluation: Using a quantitative method 
According to the received tenders, only four solutions were selected to demonstrate the 
evaluation of our approach, which we believe are enough to show the effectiveness of such an 
approach, knowing that they used the most powerful SIEMs existing in the market nowadays 
that are developed by well-known, skilful and expert vendors. 
As described in section 6.3.2.1, each requirement is assigned two different parameters, which 
are the weight (W) and the requirement value (V):  
 The weight (W) represents the importance of current requirement in the solution 
from the user point of view, and is assigned initially when the customer defines 
his requirements, for example, a mandatory requirement has a high value 
compared to nice-to-have ones. 
 The requirement value (V) is the grade assigned to evaluate the answer of the 
supplier to the current requirement in the under-evaluation SIEM solution. 
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Then, a score (S) is calculated for each requirement (S=W*V), and after that a total for each 
requirement section is computed, and finally a total score is computed for the whole solution. 
The approach also suggested to use a non-linear growth scale because of its ability to 
differentiate between the values using the high growth rate, and so requirement value will get 
a non-linear value as suggested in the approach and will vary between 0, 1, 2 and 4 
corresponding a zero, low, medium and high requirement evaluation. On the other hand, the 
weight will vary between zero and one, where one represents a critical requirement.   
Therefore, to evaluate those solutions, an quantitative evaluation is used to show the 
requirement-based evaluation. Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 present the quantitative evaluation of the four 
received SIEM solutions. 
SUPPLIER 1, PRODUCT X: 
Supplier 1 offered a solution based on a product X, the solution composed of three layers:  
(a) Collection layer that uses collection nodes to collect the logs, and to parse and 
normalize. 
(b) Processing layer for data storage and correlations based on specific rules. 
(c) Analysis layer for reporting, and alerts or offense investigation.  
In addition, the supplier offered a solution that can be deployed using two alternative 
architecture for deployment: 
(a) All-in-One deployment, where all layers are within a single node. Multiple nodes 
(dedicated appliances HW+SW) will be used based on the need, 
(b) Distributed deployment, that consists of multiple nodes, composed of multiple 
nodes (dedicated appliances HW+SW). 
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The solution covers most of the requirements, e.g. indexing, normalization, compression, and 
hashing for tamper proof, and it is able to parse a lot of sources and supports also custom 
parsing. 
Moreover, it is able to store events/logs locally for a long period. In addition, based on the 
proposed architecture of deployment, high availability is preserved.  
Table 7 Evaluation of the SIEM solution by Supplier 1 
Product X 
Supplier 1 
Requiremen
t 
Weight 
(W) 
Value 
(V) 
Score(S) Total 
PLATFORM a1 1.0 4 4 
43.8 
a2 1.0 2 2 
a3 0.9 2 1.8 
a4 0.8 2 1.6 
a5 1.0 4 4 
a6 1.0 2 2 
a7 1.0 2 2 
a8 1.0 2 2 
a9 1.0 2 2 
a10 1.0 4 4 
a11 1.0 2 2 
a12 0.8 2 1.6 
a13 0.8 1 0.8 
a14 0.8 1 0.8 
a15 1.0 1 1 
a16 0.8 2 1.6 
a17 0.8 1 0.8 
a18 1.0 2 2 
a19 1.0 4 4 
a20 0.9 2 1.8 
a21 0.6 1 0.6 
a22 0.7 2 1.4 
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a23 0.5 0 0 
OPERATIONS b1 1.0 1 1 
b2 1.0 1 1 
3.8 b3 0.9 2 1.8 
b4 0.8 0 0 
INTERGRATI
ONS 
c1 0.8 1 0.8 
2.1 
c2 0.5 0 0 
c3 0.8 0 0 
c4 0.8 1 0.8 
c5 0.5 1 0.5 
ADVANCED 
FEATURES 
d1 0.7 2 1.4 
3.7 
d2 0.6 1 0.6 
d3 0.6 2 1.2 
d4 0.5 1 0.5 
LICENSING 
AND 
SUPPORT 
e1 1.0 2 2 
12.6 
e2 1.0 1 1 
e3 1.0 2 2 
e4 0.8 2 1.6 
e5 1.0 2 2 
e6 1.0 4 4 
    TOTAL 
SCORE 
66 
 
SUPPLIER 2, PRODUCT X:  
The solution proposed by supplier two uses product Y. It has a modular and distributed 
architecture, and is composed of two layers: 
(a) A layer that groups collection and standardization, it can receive logs of any type of 
data source within the network without the need to install agent designed for each 
specific platform.   
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(b) A layer for correlation on the main appliance. 
The solution uses a hardware-based appliance (On premise or in cloud) that is able to support 
continuous traffic. 
However, the solution lacks a lot of the main requirements such as indexing, hashing, 
normalization, customizable dashboard per user, and for compliance reports, etc…  
Table 8. Evaluation of the SIEM solution by Supplier 2 
SIEM 
Supplier 2 Product Y 
Requirement Weight 
(W) 
Value 
(V) 
Score 
(S) 
Total 
PLATFORM a1 1.0 1 1 31.4 
a2 1.0 4 4 
a3 0.9 1 0.9 
a4 0.8 1 0.8 
a5 1.0 4 4 
a6 1.0 0 0 
a7 1.0 2 2 
a8 1.0 4 4 
a9 1.0 1 1 
a10 1.0 4 4 
a11 1.0 0 0 
a12 0.8 2 1.6 
a13 0.8 1 0.8 
a14 0.8 1 0.8 
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a15 1.0 1 1 
a16 0.8 2 1.6 
a17 0.8 1 0.8 
a18 1.0 0 0 
a19 1.0 0 0 
a20 0.9 2 1.8 
a21 0.6 1 0.6 
a22 0.7 1 0.7 
a23 0.5 0 0 
OPERATIONS b1 1.0 1 1 2.9 
b2 1.0 1 1 
b3 0.9 1 0.9 
b4 0.8 0 0 
INTERGRATIONS c1 0.8. 1 0.8 1.6 
c2 0.5 0 0 
c3 0.8 0 0 
c4 0.8 1 0.8 
c5 0.5 0 0 
ADVANCED 
FEATURES 
d1 0.7 0 0 0 
d2 0.6 0 0 
d3 0.6 0 0 
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d4 0.5 0 0 
LICENSING AND 
SUPPORT 
e1 1.0 2 2 9.6 
e2 1.0 2 2 
e3 1.0 1 1 
e4 0.8 2 1.6 
e5 1.0 2 2 
e6 1.0 1 1 
    
 
TOTAL 
SCORE 
45.5 
 
SUPPLIER 3, PRODUCT Z:  
This solution is divided on three layers: collection, archiving and correlation.  
(a) Collection layer: composed of software instances (agents) where each agent works 
on a source. 
(b) Management layer: composed of hardware appliances to manage logs. 
(c) Correlation layer: a copy of the collected logs is sent to this layer to be processed; 
it consists of one hardware and is able to handle fair number of EPS (real time 
correlation).  
The solution ensures high availability through deploying redundant appliances. Other main 
requirements that this solution covers are indexing, hashing and normalization. However the 
license is activated at the beginning of the deployment process and there is no delayed license.  
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Table 9. Evaluation of the SIEM solution by Supplier 3 
SIEM 
Supplier 3 Product Z 
Requirement Weight 
(W) 
Value 
(V) 
Score(s) Total 
PLATFORM a1 1.0 4 4 
47.3 
a2 1.0 2 2 
a3 0.9 2 1.8 
a4 0.8 2 1.6 
a5 1.0 4 4 
a6 1.0 4 4 
a7 1.0 4 4 
a8 1.0 2 2 
a9 1.0 1 1 
a10 1.0 4 4 
a11 1.0 2 2 
a12 0.8 2 1.6 
a13 0.8 1 0.8 
a14 0.8 1 0.8 
a15 1.0 1 1 
a16 0.8 2 1.6 
a17 0.8 1 0.8 
a18 1.0 2 2 
a19 1.0 4 4 
a20 0.9 2 1.8 
a21 0.6 1 0.6 
a22 0.7 2 1.4 
a23 0.5 1 0.5 
OPERATIONS b1 1.0 2 2 
4.8 
b2 1.0 1 1 
b3 0.9 2 1.8 
b4 0.8 0 0 
INTERGRATIONS c1 0.8. 1 0.8 
6.3 
c2 0.5 1 0.5 
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c3 0.8 1 0.8 
c4 0.8 4 3.2 
c5 0.5 2 1 
ADVANCED 
FEATURES 
d1 0.7 2 1.4 
4.2 
d2 0.6 1 0.6 
d3 0.6 2 1.2 
d4 0.5 2 1 
LICENSING AND 
SUPPORT 
e1 1.0 1 1 
8 
e2 1.0 2 2 
e3 1.0 2 2 
e4 0.8 0 0 
e5 1.0 2 2 
e6 1.0 1 1 
    TOTAL 
SCORE 
70.6 
 
SUPPLIER 4, PRODUCT T:  
The solution’s architecture is distributed in its operation, it includes: 
(a) Collection layer composed of nodes for event collection, parsing, and filtering. 
(b) Storage layer: composed of nodes for indexing and storing in database, and for 
rule/report computation. 
(c) Processing and correlation layer: for processing tasks. 
The solution has a scale out architecture for analytics, where the layers work in a co-operative 
fashion to provide scalability. A lot of the main requirements are compliant, however, there is 
no mention for normalization and hashing, the anonymization of logs is not supported, and the 
license for testing period is too short. 
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Table 10. Evaluation of the SIEM solution by Supplier 4 
SIEM 
Supplier 4 Product T 
Requirement Weight 
(W) 
Value 
(V) 
Score 
(S) 
Total 
PLATFORM a1 1 2 2 36.7 
a2 1 1 1 
a3 0.9 1 0.9 
a4 0.8 1 0.8 
a5 1 1 1 
a6 1 4 4 
a7 1 2 2 
a8 1 1 1 
a9 1 1 1 
a10 1 4 4 
a11 1 4 4 
a12 0.8 2 1.6 
a13 0.8 1 0.8 
a14 0.8 1 0.8 
a15 1 1 1 
a16 0.8 2 1.6 
a17 0.8 1 0.8 
a18 1 2 2 
a19 1 4 4 
a20 0.9 2 1.8 
a21 0.6 1 0.6 
a22 0.7 0 0 
119 
 
a23 0.5 0 0 
OPERATIONS b1 1 1 1 5.4 
b2 1 1 1 
b3 0.9 2 1.8 
b4 0.8 2 1.6 
INTERGRATIONS c1 0.8. 1 0.8 7.1 
c2 0.5 1 0.5 
c3 0.8 2 1.6 
c4 0.8 4 3.2 
c5 0.5 2 1 
ADVANCED 
FEATURES 
d1 0.7 2 1.4 4.2 
d2 0.6 1 0.6 
d3 0.6 2 1.2 
d4 0.5 2 1 
LICENSING AND 
SUPPORT 
e1 1 2 2 7.6 
e2 1 1 1 
e3 1 1 1 
e4 0.8 2 1.6 
e5 1 1 1 
e6 1 1 1 
    
 
TOTAL 
SCORE 
61 
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Therefore, applying the quantitative evaluation on the received SIEMs will output an 
evaluation (total score) for each solution. At the end, two solutions are selected as qualified 
SIEM solutions, where only one of them will be adopted finally. In the next section, 
applicability evaluation is applied to select one of the two qualified SIEM solutions. 
6.4.2.2  Applicability evaluation: Using a qualitative method 
As said before, not always the solution that got the highest score in the requirement-based 
evaluation will be adopted; however, as explained before, there are other factors and indicators 
that should be considered, and they are represented in the applicability evaluation. After 
evaluating quantitatively, the SIEM solution, the next step is to apply the qualitative evaluation 
(applicability evaluation). In our case, the applicability evaluation is applied to choose between 
the two qualified solutions (by supplier 1 and supplier 3). Tables 11 and 12 shows the applied 
qualitative evaluation: 
SUPPLIER 1 PRODUCT X 
Table 11. Qualitative evaluation for the first SIEM solution by Supplier 1 
Supplier 1 
Product X 
 
Indicators Importance or 
weight 
Evaluation NOTES 
Applicability 
Level of Compliance High Excellent High compliance 
Complexity High Very Good Very Flexible 
Quality of services/ 
capabilities 
High Very Good  
Robust Architecture High Very Good 
High availability is 
guaranteed 
Scalability Medium Good  
Clearness/ complete 
description/ vision 
High Excellent  
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Licensing and 
support services 
Installation duration/ 
clearness of road map 
High Very Good 
Clear roadmap 
including all steps 
Licensing High Very Good 
Clear dimensioning 
including  user 
acceptance test period 
Support Medium Good 24x7 
Training Medium Good  
Advanced Features 
Additional features Low Good  
Integration with third 
parties 
Medium Good  
Other indicators 
Expertise/Skill of Vendor/ 
Supplier 
Medium Excellent One major player 
Price Medium Excellent  
OVERALL RESULT ACCEPTED 
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SUPPLIER 3, PRODUCT Z 
Table 12. Qualitative evaluation for the third SIEM solution by Supplier 3 
Supplier 3 
Product Z 
Indicators 
Importance 
or weight 
Evaluation NOTES 
Applicability 
Level of Compliance High Very Good Mostly compliant 
Complexity High Good Non trivial deployment 
Quality of services/ 
capabilities 
High Very Good  
Robust Architecture High Very Good 
High redundancy is 
guaranteed 
Scalability Medium Good  
Clearness/ complete 
description 
High Excellent  
Licensing and 
support services 
Installation duration/ 
clearness of road map 
High Very Good  
Licensing High Insufficient 
Uses acceptance-testing 
period was not included 
and low dimensioning of 
EPS 
 
Support Medium Good  
Training Medium Good  
Advanced 
Features 
Additional features Low Good  
Integration with third 
parties 
Medium Good  
Other indicators 
Expertise/Skill of 
Vendor/ Supplier 
Medium Very Good 
Major player but adopting 
less know system 
integrator 
Price Medium Insufficient 
A bit high if compared to 
proposed number of 
licenses 
OVERALL RESULT REJECTED 
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Both the two SIEM solutions (by supplier 1 and 3) got the highest value. However, the first 
solution matched more the customer’s needs and the defined indicators. Even if the solution 
proposed by supplier 3 got a higher value, it was not selected. The first solution offered two 
architectures to choose from, which helps in the ease of deployment, better licensing, support, 
and it matched another relevant indicator, which is the price, offering a solution that is 
consistent to the budget. 
6.5 Comparison  
To prove the eligibility of using our approach we select Gartner’s work to compare with. 
Gartner Inc. is one of the leading information technology research and advisory company that 
deliver the technology-related insight necessary for clients to make the right decisions, 
research, analyze and interpret the business of IT within the context of their individual role.  
Gartner published its 2018 Critical Capabilities for Security Information and Event 
Management report [35] to evaluate and rank different SIEM vendors (products). First, they 
started by specifying the critical capabilities that a SIEM should have. Critical capabilities 
are architecture, deployment, operations and support, log and data management, real-time 
monitoring, analytics, data and application monitoring, threat and environmental context, user 
context and monitoring, incident management and threat detection tools. 
After that, they defined three use cases: basic security monitoring, complex security 
monitoring, and advanced threat defense, where the SIEM vendors are evaluated in each use 
case. These use cases used represent three “operational” levels in which the SIEM will be 
deployed.  
Critical capabilities are then weighted, where each capability is given a weight in terms of its 
relative importance in each use case. In addition, for each SIEM product, the critical 
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capabilities are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is a poor requirement, whereas 5 is an 
outstanding (significantly exceeds requirements). Finally, an overall score is carried out for 
each SIEM on the three different use cases. To determine an overall score for each product in 
the use cases, the ratings (evaluations) are multiplied by the weightings to come up with the 
product score in use cases. Different SIEM products developed by the most expertise and 
skilled vendors are used in the evaluation applied by [35], where each vendor’s product or 
service is evaluated in terms of how well it delivers each of the capabilities defined. This kind 
of evaluation can be defined as a product driven evaluation, where the capabilities of the 
product are evaluated without differentiating the customer’s needs factor.  
On the other hand, our approach suggests the customer to create a more detailing list of 
requirements that reflects their needs, which is a subjective and detailed list representing the 
SIEM seeking for, therefore, to receive an overall solution and not just a product, and so the 
evaluation will be influenced by these specific requirements. 
Moreover, we defined a second level of evaluation, which is a qualitative evaluation method 
(applicability based) that selects from the qualified solution evaluated previously by the 
quantitative evaluation method (requirement based). 
Table 13. A comparison between the proposed SIEM evaluation approach and Gartner’s report 
Product-driven SIEM evaluation  
 
Customer-driven: Our SIEM 
Evaluation Approach 
Suggests a list of the main requirements 
(capabilities) that a powerful SIEM should have 
Suggests a list of requirements with some 
specifications from a customer point of view 
Has a flat approach when weighting the requirements 
Can adopt weights to reflect more significant 
requirements   
Uses quantitative evaluation Uses both quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
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Evaluation is applied for general use cases 
Evaluation is applied based on customer needs and 
context 
Evaluates a product 
Evaluate an overall solution: product, architecture, 
deployment, price, etc… 
 
In conclusion, organizations tend to ensure good management controls are in place to avoid 
unexpected outcomes and to keep on track, so they require a structured approach for managing 
their tasks. This chapter proposed a thorough approach to support companies that are seeking 
to adopt SIEM systems into their environments; it suggests suitable technological and business 
requirements that are believed to be valuable in a SIEM system and proposes a two-phase 
evaluation process to measure the compliance and applicability of a SIEM. At the end, as said 
before, this approach must be completed by a testing -phase of the selected SIEM to confirm 
that the received requirements are as described by the suppliers. 
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7 Chapter seven: Risk Analysis Using PILAR software: An 
instructional document to use PILAR 
Risk analysis is one of the CSAC department’s roles at Hitachi rail STS Company. Risk 
analysis is the process for estimating the risks to which the system’s assets are exposed to, and 
then should be followed by the treatment phase. In the field of cyber security, there are a lot of 
methods used, and in this chapter we aim to find a methodical way to conduct a risk analysis 
study which takes into account cyber and physical sides of the system under study. This part 
of the work is represented as an instructional document that is also a part of the ISMS and can 
be used in the future referring to it in case there is need to know how risk analysis is applied at 
the company.  
 
Figure 26. PhD Goals (related to the ISMS): Risk Analysis Using PILAR 
There are several approaches for the problem of analyzing the risks: informal handbooks, 
methodical approaches or supporting tools, where all provide a guide for risk analysis. 
However, methods might differ in some steps, or in the way of identifying and valuating the 
assets or threats. Some are basically used in cyber security of information systems, and others 
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can be used in physical security. The great challenge of these approaches is the complexity of 
the problem they have to face; complexity in the sense that there are many elements to be 
considered and, if it is not done rigorously, the conclusions will be unreliable. 
7.1.1 MAGERIT Methodology: Objectives and steps 
One of the methodical approaches is MAGERIT method suggested by Enisa [27], which is the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security. MAGERIT is an open 
methodology for Risk Analysis and Management, developed by the Spanish Ministry of Public 
Administrations. 
Magerit is a risk analysis and management methodology for information systems developed by 
CSAE (Consejo Superior de Administraci´on Electr´onica), Spain [28]. It was published in 
1997. Magerit v2 was published in 2005, and Magerit v3 was published in July, 2014. 
Vendor name: Ministerio de Administraciones Publicas (Spanish Ministry for Public 
Administrations). 
Following a methodical way in a risk management study is important in order to obtain an 
efficient study. The objective of Magerit method is to cover both risk analysis and risk 
treatment for a thorough risk management. The ultimate aim of using MAGERIT is to make a 
methodical approach that leaves no room for improvisation, and not to depend on the analyst’s 
whim. 
The purpose of Magerit is directly related to the generalized use of IT systems, 
communications, and electronic media, which bring evident benefits for the users but which is 
also subject to certain risks that must be kept under control by means of security 
countermeasures that generate confidence in the use of these media. This method follows the 
international concepts as in: 
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1. ISO 31000:2009 – Risk management – Principles and guidelines. 
According to ISO 31000 terminology, Magerit responds to what is called “Risk 
Management Process”, the section “Implementing Risk Management” within the 
“Framework for Risk Management”. 
 
2. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 - Information technology - Security techniques - Information 
security risk management. 
Next section lists the steps of Magerit methodology. 
7.1.2 MAGERIT method steps 
MAGERIT offers a systematic method for analyzing risks, and helps in describing and 
planning the appropriate measures for keeping the risks under control. And finally, prepare the 
organization for the processes of evaluating, auditing, certifying or accrediting, as relevant in 
each case. 
 
Figure 27. ISO 3100- Framework for risk management 
 
It also aims to achieve uniformity in the REPORTS containing the findings and conclusions 
from a risk analysis and management project through the following steps: 
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1. Value mode (Identification and valuation of assets): First step is to identify the assets 
composing the system or the organization and characterizes them according to their 
type. And then describe the value of the assets (critical, very important, important…) 
for the organization as well as the dependencies between the various assets. 
2. Risk map: Identify the threats to which the assets are exposed, and evaluate them. This 
activity identifies the relevant threats on the system and characterizes them according 
to the estimates of occurrence (likelihood). 
3. Statement of applicability (define available safeguards): For a set of safeguards indicate 
which ones are applicable in the information system under study, and which ones are 
meaningless. Given the wide variety of safeguards, it is necessary to go through all of 
them and retain (keep) only those which are relevant for protecting the asset. 
4. Safeguard evaluation: Evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing safeguards in 
relation to the risks systems face. In other words, check the effectiveness of the existing 
safeguards deployed in the system and how they would behave against the threats we 
define (report on the safeguards deployed, characterized by their degree of 
effectiveness). 
5. Risk status: Classification of the assets by their residual risk; that is to determine the 
residual impact on the system, by what could happen, taking the safeguards used into 
consideration. 
6. Output: Report detailing for each asset the impact and the potential and residual risks 
regarding every threat. 
7. Deficiencies report (Vulnerabilities report): Absence or weakness of the safeguards that 
appear as appropriate to reduce the risks to the system. A report identifying the 
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deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the system. (e.g.: what protection should be available 
and it is not currently). 
8. Compliance (Meeting some requirements): Formal statement that it is in line and in 
accordance with the corresponding regulations. Some organization has its own 
established regulations which must be taken into account. 
9. Security plan: Group of security programs (master plans or strategic plans) that put the 
risk treatment decisions into action. Decision-making concerning risk treatment may 
lead to recommend safeguards assessing its influence on impact and risk indicators. 
Security plan when implemented and operated, must meets the proposed objectives 
with the level of risk accepted by the Management. 
7.1.3 PILAR software 
PILAR software is used to perform the steps of the MAGERIT methodology. It’s GUI 
(graphical user interface) enables the user to execute the MAGERIT in an understandable and 
easy way. The tool provides fast calculations and generates a quantity of textual and graphical 
reports [29].   Note that running PILAR requires a license and a JDK to be installed on the PC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. PILAR: First Screen 
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PILAR software has been funded by the Spanish National Security Agency. It is designed to 
support the risk management process along long periods, providing incremental analysis as the 
safeguards improve. Its functionalities include mainly: 
 Quantitative and qualitative Risk Analysis and Management. 
 Quantitative and qualitative Business Impact Analysis & Continuity of Operations. 
PILAR enables the user to create a project, identify the assets for the system under study, 
generate threats and safeguards and other functionalities. The figure below is for creating a 
new project: 
 
Figure 29. PILAR: Create New Project 
Creating a new project requires at least a code and a name. Other details could be added such 
as a description, responsible person, organization version and date. 
The user can change from the list to choose the level and the options that will be presented. 
 
Figure 30. PILAR: Level of user 
 
The user can also modify the behavior of PILAR in several aspects from the Edit>Options 
menu. 
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Figure 31. PILAR options 
 
These options are specific for each project analysis, so editing options is done only when a 
project is open, and the options will affect only the current project.  Some personalized versions 
of the tool may offer additional options. For example, the valuation of assets may include 
dependencies or domains, so the system may be rated asset by asset (plus dependencies) or by 
security domains. 
On the other hand, the identification of the threats can be manual, automatic or mix. And other 
options could be changed like the likelihood type (frequency, level, potential…) 
 
Figure 32. PILAR: Change options 
 
The department of Cybersecurity Assurance and Control at Hitachi Rail STS Company uses 
PILAR software to conduct risk analysis studies. For this goal, a document was created that 
includes all the instructions that should be followed in any such study by the department.  
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The work was demonstrated by writing a 70-pages document about using PILAR in any risk 
assessment project in the future. This document is used as an internal instructional document 
of the company; it will be a part of the Information security management system (ISMS) of the 
company. 
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8 Chapter eight: Conducting vulnerability assessment scans 
Using Fortify Web Inspect 
Vulnerability assessment is also one of the CSAC department’s roles at Hitachi rail STS 
Company. Vulnerability assessment is the process of defining, identifying, classifying and 
prioritizing vulnerabilities in computer systems, applications and network infrastructures and 
providing the organization doing the assessment with the necessary knowledge, awareness and 
risk background to understand the threats to its environment and react appropriately. 
Vulnerability assessments depend on discovering different types of system or network 
vulnerabilities, which means the assessment process includes using a variety of tools, scanners 
and methodologies to identify vulnerabilities, threats and risks. 
 
Figure 33. PhD Goals (related to the ISMS): Conducting a vulnerability assessment using Fortify WebInspect 
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 Some of the different types of vulnerability assessment scans include the following: 
 Network-based scans are used to identify possible network security attacks. This type of 
scan can also detect vulnerable systems on wired or wireless networks. 
 Host-based scans are used to locate and identify vulnerabilities in servers, workstations or 
other network hosts. This type of scan usually examines ports and services that may also 
be visible to network-based scans, but it offers greater visibility into the configuration 
settings and patch history of scanned systems. 
 Wireless network scans of an organization's Wi-Fi networks usually focus on points of 
attack in the wireless network infrastructure. In addition to identifying rogue access points, 
a wireless network scan can also validate that a company's network is securely configured. 
 Application scans can be used to test websites in order to detect known software 
vulnerabilities and erroneous configurations in network or web applications. 
 Database scans can be used to identify the weak points in a database so as to prevent 
malicious attacks, such as SQL injection attacks. 
In this chapter, we aim to show how vulnerability assessment could be applied for web 
applications using a vulnerability scanner. Web Application Vulnerability Scanners are 
automated tools that scan web applications, normally from the outside, to look for security 
vulnerabilities such as Cross-site scripting, SQL Injection, Command Injection, Path Traversal 
and insecure server configuration.  
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Figure 34. An example for the dashboard for a web application vulnerability scanner 
 
This part of the work defines one of the web application vulnerability scanners, called “Fortify 
web inspect”, this part of the work was concluded by an instructional document that was also 
a part of the ISMS and can be used in the future. HPE Security Fortify WebInspect is an 
automated Web application and Web services vulnerability scanning solution. As you initiate 
a scan, Fortify WebInspect assigns agents that dynamically catalog all areas of a Web 
application. These agents report their findings to a main security engine that analyzes the 
results. Fortify WebInspect then launches "Threat Agents" to evaluate the gathered information 
and apply attack algorithms to determine the existence and relative severity of vulnerabilities. 
With this smart approach, Fortify WebInspect continuously applies appropriate scan resources 
that adapt to your specific application environment. 
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Figure 35. Fortify Web Inspect Start Page 
Fortify WebInspect employs an extensive arsenal of attack agents designed to detect security 
flaws in web-based applications. It probes the system with thousands of HTTP requests and 
evaluates each individual response. This session-based assessment reports each vulnerability, 
pinpoints its location in the application, and recommends corrective actions that should be 
taken. It is, basically, a quantitative analysis of the system. 
Fortify WebInspect has a set auditing policies, settings, and other configurations that changes 
the behavior and its way of functionality. So there is a need to follow certain set of settings and 
policies that best fits scanning a target URL, website or a webservice.  
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Figure 36. Fortify Dashboard after conducting a scan 
The work was demonstrated by creating an instructional document about using this software in 
the vulnerability assessment projects. This document will be used as an internal document for 
the company; it will be also a part of the Information security management system (ISMS) of 
the company.  
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9 Chapter nine: Classifying web attacks using network statistical 
features and machine learning: Analyzing the behavior of the 
attack generator  
 
Web attacks arise and continue evolving day after day; they could be of different types and 
targeting diverse assets. In order to ensure the security against web attacks, many procedures, 
appliances and countermeasures might be developed and installed. Firewalls, intrusion 
detection and prevention systems are security appliances that could be used to detect them. 
Such appliances might be signatures based detection, or even anomaly based detection that use 
machine learning techniques to analyze the network. Both detection of the anomalies and their 
type, could be accomplished by using machine-learning techniques applied on a relevant 
dataset. A lot of work was done in the field of intrusion detection and classification of web 
attacks, however, few if no one addressed the detection of the tool type used by the attacker. 
Detecting the type of the tool used to generate a web attack could be worthy and might aid in 
the prevention and mitigation of web attacks, since any information about the attackers might 
be helpful and worth a lot to the cyber security analysts. In this work, our goal is to analyze the 
behavior of the attacker; by not only detecting the type of the attack, but also creating a second 
classification layer to detect the type of the software used by the attackers. This chapter presents 
a method to analyze the behavior of the attacker by means of classifier models. The principle 
of operation is to deploy conventional classifier techniques for discriminating the categories of 
attacks, and, at the same time, to implement an additional classification layer to detect the type 
of software used by the attacker. The chapter shows empirically that it is possible to 
discriminate different tool by using computationally light, white-box models. As a result, 
analysts and network managers can better understand the determinist rules extracted from data 
and use them to enhance security policies and systems. 
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The use of computers, storage, networking and other devices to create, store and exchange all 
forms of data has increased significantly in the last years. Interconnectivity and data generated 
by devices has resulted in ‘an unprecedented improvement in the quality of life’ [44]. 
Particularly, the use of websites and web applications has also increased in recent years 
especially by companies and critical infrastructure applications that plays a key role in 
economy and society. The number of websites has reached an unprecedented number in the 
last few years since the World Wide Web project was born in 1989. Both websites and web 
applications have become a basic part of business in nowadays.   
Websites are collections of web pages, they can be accessed using a browser to read and look 
at everything that's on a website, they provide and present content for readers. On the other 
hand, web applications are defined by being interactive. A web application is used in order to 
perform a function and use some specific features, it can be defined as a web site that does 
more than displaying content, it has a business logic. It’s intended for user interactions, 
performing actual business functions. Using websites and web applications, businesses can 
now develop and reach its goals much faster. Moreover, businesses might obtain an effective 
economic growth if they adopt an appropriate one. Good Websites and web applications can 
play a crucial role in the branding process. Using them, the opportunity of selling the services 
or products is increased; they represent the first communication channel between potential 
customers and the business organization, and at the same time, popularity of the organization 
gets boosted and lead generation improves. Small businesses, banks, and major industrial 
concerns all depend on web applications. Websites are the public face of both business and 
government, so any issues with a website can damage reputation. For this and other reasons, 
web application owners are motivated to improve and support their sites. Proper attention to 
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cybersecurity is a key part of any such strategy.  Companies, organizations, critical 
infrastructure, governments, or even small businesses are all using web applications to manage 
an importance part of their business. Nowadays, there are over 1.5 billion websites on the 
World Wide Web today. Of these, less than 200 million are active.  By "Website”, we 
mean unique hostname (a name which can be resolved, using a name server, into an IP 
Address) [45] [46]. 
 
Figure 37. Total number of websites. Source: NetCraft and Internet Live stats 
In parallel, web attacks are evolving and targeting vulnerable and sensitive sites, which may 
cause unacceptable threats especially for systems that are part of the critical infrastructure or 
have a high value business. In most of the cases, websites are usually connected to databases 
that might contain confidential information, if attackers scanning sites for vulnerabilities gain 
unauthorized access to the sites, it might lead to hazardous situations with catastrophic 
consequences. 
In addition, according to SiteLock, a global leader in website security [47], approximately 6% 
of websites—up to 113 MILLION WEBSITES globally—have a security vulnerability. In Q1 
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2018, SiteLock surveyed over 250 website owners to assess their knowledge and what they 
fear most about website security. Almost half (46%) of website owners surveyed reported that 
their website was the victim of a security incident in 2017. These responses serve as a reminder 
that a website security attack can happen at any time to anyone. Of those that did report a 
cyberattack on their website, 36% reported that the incident caused lost revenue and harmed 
their bottom line. A staggering 42% of respondents also reported that their biggest website 
security fear was a defacement, indicating a lack of awareness that the quieter and stealthier 
malware attacks are just as, if not more, damaging [48]. 
A lot of strategies might be adopted to secure websites and web applications against web 
attacks, one way is intrusion detection using machine learning techniques, where a network 
intrusion detection system is used aiming to classify the monitored traffic as either “legitimate” 
or “malicious, and sometimes to detect the type of the malicious traffic. Both detection of the 
anomalies and their type could be accomplished by using machine learning applied on an 
appropriate dataset. Intrusion detection by using machine-learning techniques is a classical 
solution to secure websites and web applications. Intrusion-detection systems classify the 
observed traffic as either legitimate or malicious, and sometimes can detect the type of the 
malicious traffic. These goals could both be accomplished by using machine-learning tools, 
trained with a suitable dataset. Many datasets such as DARPA98, KDD99, ISC2012, and 
ADFA, exist for that purpose; these datasets contain data corresponding to normal and 
malicious traffic,  and mostly support either intrusion detection or to attack-type recognition. 
Despite their effectiveness, machine-learning methods have two major drawbacks: first, 
accurate models typically require a considerable amount of memory and floating point 
operations. Secondly, in most cases human users cannot interpret the actual classification 
principles applied by the models (an issue known as a black-box phenomenon). 
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The research presented in this chapter aims to get precious side-information about the attackers 
that might help the manager in both the mitigation and the prevention process. This is attained 
by detecting the actual type of software used in staging web attacks.  
The first step of this approach is to gather a significant dataset of web attacks for addressing 
this aspect; hence, the training set should cover not only the attack type but also info about the 
exploiting tool. To maximize coverage, that dataset should replicate/cover the most significant 
attacks against web applications; each attack scheme should be implemented by using different 
tools to encompass the possible behaviors of the attacks. 
Then, one trains a two-layer classification model to reach the combined goal; the first layer 
detects the type of the attack, whereas the additional classifier classifies the attacking tool. The 
latter layer holds a classification tree; that straightforward model has been selected because of 
its limited computational cost; more importantly, human supervisors can inspect and interpret 
the overall decision process. 
The major contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follow: 
● A novel dataset for attacking tool classification containing attacks generated by the 
most common tool for attacks generation; 
● An effective strategy for attacking tool classification; 
● A strategy for online classification based on low cost/human interpretable models. 
 
9.1 Background and Related work: 
Analyzing the network traffic, allow network defenders to perform a variety of analysis and 
can help them understand more what is going on in their network.  For example, when 
examining web traffic, network flow data would contain the source and destination IP 
addresses involved, the amount of data sent, the number of packets, and the time duration of 
the communication, and much more features. Analyzing the network traffic represents a 
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wealthy process that can be employed for the purpose of understanding how everything on the 
network works by examining the statistical and characteristic behavior. Both detection of the 
anomalies and their type could be accomplished by using machine learning. Many datasets 
exists to help in the detection and classification of anomalies, they include DARPA98, KDD99, 
ISC2012, and ADFA 13 that have been used by researchers to detect intrusions and their types. 
Some of these datasets suffer from lack of traffic diversity and volumes, some of them do not 
cover the variety of attacks, while others anonymized packet information and payload which 
cannot reflect the current trends, or they lack feature set and metadata [49]. On the other hand, 
other datasets cannot be shared due to privacy issues or others are out of date because of the 
continuous change in attack strategies. There exist a number of datasets used in the field of 
network security and network security. As our work deals with web attacks in particular; in the 
next two subsections we list the most emerging web attacks nowadays, and present the most 
used datasets in similar works.  
9.1.1 Backgrounds: Web applications and web attacks 
Among the most critical security risks affecting web applications nowadays, the Open Web 
Application Security Project, or OWASP, defines the top 10 security risks to web applications. 
OWASP is an international non-profit organization dedicated to web application security. One 
of their best-known projects is the OWASP Top 10. The OWASP Top 10 is a powerful 
awareness document for web application security. It represents a broad consensus about the 
most critical security risks to web applications. Project members include a variety of security 
experts from around the world who have shared their expertise to produce this list. The 
OWASP TOP 10 security risks are Injections and Broken Authentication, Broken Access 
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Control, Security Misconfiguration, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Insecure Deserialization, 
Using Components With Known Vulnerabilities, Insufficient Logging And Monitoring [50]. 
On the other hand, in a study in 2019 about cyber threats, “Positive Technologies” [51], a 
leading global provider of enterprise security solutions, stated that web application hacking is 
one of the most frequent attacks on both organizations and individuals. Hacked sites can be 
used for a multitude of things: distributing malware, stealing data, posting ads or forbidden 
information, committing fraud, or penetrating an internal network.  
Moreover, according to the Positive Technologies 2019 report that lists the main web attacks 
reported in the year, brute force, sql injection, path traversal, local file information, leakage, 
XSS, and Denial of Service (DOS) were among the most common attacks affecting websites 
[52]. 
 
 
Figure 38. Top 10 web application attacks reported by “Positive Technologies” 
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9.1.2 Intrusion detection Using Machine Learning techniques //paraphrase 
From the theoretical point of view, network intrusion detection systems mainly aim to classify 
the monitored traffic as either “legitimate” or “malicious.” Therefore, machine learning 
approaches are appropriate to solve such problems; and they have recently been widely applied 
to help better manage network intrusion detection issues. Machine learning (ML) is a field of 
artificial intelligence, which refers to a set of techniques that give computer systems the ability 
to “learn.” Typically, machine learning algorithms, such as artificial neural networks, learn 
from data samples to categorize or find patterns in the data, and enable computer systems to 
make predictions on new or unseen data instances based on the discovered patterns [53]. 
Machine Learning is a way of making a computer learn and take decisions without being 
explicitly programmed [54]. Machine learning techniques work by establishing a model that 
enables the analyzed patterns to be categorized. In general, machine learning techniques are 
able to deal with three common problems: classification, regression, and clustering. Network 
intrusion detection can be considered as a classification problem. Therefore, a labeled training 
dataset is usually required for system modeling. In Supervised Machine Learning [52], the 
learning algorithms tackle classification problems, and network intrusion detection relates to 
this context. A labeled training dataset is required for system modeling. The overall process 
includes three main steps, as shown in Fig.39. [55].  
Conversely, unsupervised learning does not require a labeled sample, as the main purpose 
is to set up a description of the distribution of empirical data, to identify significant patterns or 
clusters of homogenous regions of the data space. In network security applications, 
unsupervised algorithms implement behavioral analysis and mostly aim at detecting zero-day 
attack scheme that are not covered by existing data sets. 
 
147 
 
 
Figure 39. Intrusion detection process using machine leaning techniques 
 
1. Preprocessing: the data instances that are collected from the network environment are 
structured, which can then be directly fed into the machine learning algorithm. The 
processes of feature extraction and feature selection are also applied in this phase. 
2. Training: a machine learning algorithm is adopted to characterize the patterns of 
various types of data, and build a corresponding system model. 
3. Detection: once the system model is built, the monitored traffic data will be used as 
system input to be compared to the generated system model. If the pattern of the 
observation is matched with an existing threat, an alarm will be triggered.  
Both supervised and unsupervised machine learning approaches have already been utilized 
to solve network intrusion detection problems. For instance, supervised learning-based 
classifiers have been successfully employed to detect unauthorized access, such as k-
nearest neighbor (k-NN) [56], support vector machine (SVM) [57], decision tree [58], naïve 
Bayes network [54], and random forests [59]. In addition, unsupervised learning 
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algorithms, including k-means clustering [60] and self-organized maps (SOM) [61], have 
also been applied to deal with network intrusion detection problems, with good results. 
9.1.3 The Available Datasets: 
 The two publicly available datasets that have provided something of a standardized setting in 
the past—the DARPA/Lincoln Labs packet traces [62], [63] and the KDD Cup dataset derived 
from them [64]—are now a decade old, and no longer adequate for any current study. The 
DARPA dataset contains multiple weeks of network activity from a simulated Air Force 
network, generated in 1998 and refined in 1999. 
DARPA and KDD could be said to be the most used datasets in the network intrusion detection 
problems. DARPA (Lincoln Laboratory) was created in 1998-99 for network security, however 
it does not represent real-world network traffic, and contains irregularities. Also, it is outdate 
for the effective evaluation of IDSs on modern networks, both in terms of attack types and 
network infrastructure. Moreover, it lacks actual attack data records [65] [66]. On the other 
hand, The KDD’99 was used in the 3rd knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools 
Competition for building a network intrusion detector, is an updated version of the DARPA98. 
Thiss dataset has a large number of redundant records and is studded by data corruptions that 
led to skewed testing results [67]. Both DARPA and KDD have just 4 categories of attacks and 
lacks for some important ones such as SQL Injection, XSS, brute force attacks. Other datasets 
include CAIDA (Center of Applied Internet Data Analysis 2002-2016) that is not an effective 
benchmarking datasets due to a number of shortcomings, see [68] [69] [70] [71] for details. 
Also CDX (United States Military Academy 2009): suffers from the lack of traffic diversity 
and volume [72]. Moreover most of those datasets are old and they lack for web attacks 
especially SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and brute force. In [49], Lashkari et al. Generated 
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a new IDS dataset namely CICIDS2017 which covers common web attacks such as DOS, Brute 
force, SQL Injection, cross-site scripting. The dataset is completely labelled and more than 80 
network traffic features extracted and calculated for all benign and intrusive flows by using 
CICFlowMeter software, which is publicly available in Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity 
website [73].  
In conclusion, most of the available datasets lack relevant attack categories. Some of them 
group web attacks into one class and do not differentiate between the various schemes. When 
the dataset contains indeed a variety of web attack categories and is labeled accordingly, the 
samples do not cover any info about the software tools used to stage the attacks. 
9.2 A classification layer to analyze the behavior of attacking tool:  
Cyber security analysts try to collect any information about the attackers, to help in the 
mitigation of the risks. In particular, knowing the type of the software used in attacks would 
aid a lot. Since an attack could be generated in various ways, it is clear that the attack’s behavior 
would be different based on the used tool. Even if same attack is applied, each attacking tool 
might have a specific behavior; each tool has a specific duration for the attack, specific number 
of packets per connection flow, protocol, or even the payload content, which  might lead to a 
new different behavior on the network level. 
Looking at simple statistical properties of protocol messages, such as statistics of packet inter-
arrival times and of packets’ size may be useful to perform monitoring actions [74]. “The key 
idea is that the information carried by packets at the network layer, such as packet-size an inter-
arrival time between consecutive packets, are enough to infer the nature of the application 
protocol that generated those packets [75].” According to the last research and proposed 
evaluation framework by [76], eleven characteristics, namely Attack Diversity, Anonymity, 
Available Protocols, Complete Capture, Complete Interaction, Complete Network 
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Configuration, Complete Traffic, Feature Set, Heterogeneity, Labelling, and Metadata are 
critical for a comprehensive and valid Intrusion detection systems (IDS) dataset.  
The first step in the proposed work of this chapter is to gather an appropriate dataset for a 
network traffic that represents the attacking scenario as whole, encompassing the statistical 
features characterizing both the attack type and the tool used.  In this work, the training dataset 
holds web attacks that are believed to be most frequent against web applications. The sample 
includes various categories of web attacks, generated by using a set of different tools. This aims 
to get the widest coverage of possible behaviors of attacks, and therefore to aid in the analysis 
the behavior of the tools used to generate the attacks. 
The research presented here focuses on web attacks for several reasons: 
- The increased number of web attacks 
- The diversity of tools available to demonstrate webattacks especially penetration 
testing tools 
- The availability of online web applications and websites for penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment. 
In our dataset, a group of web attacks will be used to represent the main threats affecting web 
applications. Those web attacks are Brute Force, SQL Injection, XSS, and DOS. Those attacks 
are selected based on both the OWASP top 10 security risks and Positive Technologies 2019 
report. In addition, these web attacks are believed to be enough to reach our goal in analyzing 
the behavior of the attack generator, in particular the tools used.  
The procedure includes into 3 steps. The first step involves the simulation of Web Attacks, to 
create a dataset of web attacks containing the four main categories selected above. The 
simulation relies on a set of tools, whose diversity of tools helps train the learning algorithm 
and discriminate among the different tools themselves at run time. In the second step, a suitable 
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and recent set of features remaps and labels the empirical data. Finally, a machine-learning 
algorithm supports a two-layer classification model. A pair of specific classifiers implement 
the layers: one detects the category of the web attack that is being observed, while the second 
one recognizes the type of tool adopted. The latter layer operates on the top of the former 
classifier; it processes the detected attack’s type and prompts the type of the software used to 
create the attack itself. 
 
Figure 40. The work done to create the two-layers for web attacks classification 
 
Figure 40 shows the three steps; it starts by dataset creation through simulating Web attacks. 
Then, the system applies the specific feature set to render those data into labeled (csv) files, 
each file corresponding to an attacking tool. Finally, a classification tree algorithm processes 
the resulting dataset and builds up the upper classification layer. 
9.2.1 Dataset creation: Generating web attacks 
In dataset creation phase, four types of web attacks were selected based on both the OWASP 
top 10 security risks and Positive Technologies 2019 report. These four web attacks are Brute 
Force, SQL Injection, XSS, and DOS. They are believed to be enough to reach our goal in 
analyzing the behavior of the attack generator, and in particular to show the ability of detecting 
the attacking tools used. Adding more webattacks might be part of future work. Moreover, the 
dataset we aim to create does not contain a benign traffic, as our main goal is to detect the tool 
used to generate a web attack, and though we consider that the classification is applied to 
already detected web attack. Generating the web attack was carried out against online testing 
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websites using both penetration tools and others used for attacking purposes. So for each attack 
type, a family of tools will be used. Moreover, to address the diversity of the behaviors of each 
attack, we used a set of tools to generate each web attack; these tools are used for penetration 
testing/ vulnerability assessment or for hacking purpose. Therefore: 
1. To generate DOS, the following tools were used: Slowloris, R-U-Dead-Yet, Pyloris, 
Torshammer, LOIC.  
2. To generate SQL Injection, the following tools were used: Fortify Webinspect, 
Acunetix, Jsql, Sqlmap, Arachni.  
3. To generate XSS, the following tools were used: Fortify Webinspect, Acunetix, ZAP, 
Xsser, Arachni. 
4. To generate Brute Force, the following tools were used: THC-Hydra, Medusa, Brutus, 
Wfuzz, Acunetix.  
On the other hand, the websites used to simulate the attacks are online known ones used for 
penetration testing:  
 http://zero.webappsecurity.com 
 http://testphp.vulnweb.com 
 http://testasp.vulnweb.com 
The attacks represents thousands of HTTP requests sent by these specific tools. In parallel, the 
whole network traffic during the attack simulation was sniffed and saved in PCAP files, where 
each file corresponds to a specific tool. Therefore, each attacking tool will be represented by 
its own PCAP file containing the attacks it generated, and will be used to simulate its behavior. 
Files might be unbalanced in size, number of packets, duration of attack, and that is because of 
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the tool used, where each tool has its own way and configuration in which it acts or conducts 
the attack. 
 
 
Tool used 
Attack 
duration 
(minutes) 
Total Number of 
packets sniffed during 
the attack 
Brute Force Acunetix 10 115,000 
Brutus 19 138,000 
Hydra 6 28,000 
Medusa 4 33,000 
Wfuzz 14 50,000 
 
Cross site scripting 
 
Acunetix 31 35,000 
Arachni 30 60,000 
XSSER 2 10,600 
WebInspcet 7 27,000 
Denial of service LOIC 12 213,000 
Pyloris 15 249,000 
Rudy 32 79,000 
SlowLoris 5 269,000 
Torshammer 6 102,000 
SQL Injection 
Acunetix 
More than 1 
hour 
13,000 
Arachni 50 5,000 
Jsql 25 8,000 
Sqlmap 
More than 1 
hour 
6,000 
WebInspect 40 17,000 
 
Attack 
Details 
154 
 
9.2.2 Feature selection and Labeling 
In this work, a flow-based classification is used, such type of classification is referred when 
using properties (statistical features) such as flow bytes per second, duration per flow, etc. 
Using the statistical features of a specific IP traffic flow, we can get information about the 
nature of this flow, and might be applied to classify web attacks, and in particular to detect the 
attack generator.  An IP traffic flow is by the 5-tuple composed of the following fields of the 
IP and TCP/UDP headers: 
 IP source address 
 IP destination address 
 TCP/UDP source port 
 TCP/UDP destination port 
 Protocol 
These fields are considered as 2-way (the inversion of source and destination ports and 
addresses is considered as one single flow). 
However, the first task is to change the PCAP files containing the attacks into flow-based types 
selecting some basic components (features). A feature set containing 14 components (indicated 
as features) will be used to classify each flow are listed in the Table below. This feature set is 
created by [77], it was used mainly to detect whether a flow is affected by a malware or not, it 
is selected since it represents  an effective feature set and it encompass the main characteristics 
of a network traffic, and also the use of these features is coherent with the literature in the field. 
In this chapter, we prefer concentrating on the main goal, and to leave refinements for further 
research. The experimental section will show how the following features associated to each 
flow are enough to infer the possible type of the web attack and software used. The features 
set contains: 'num_packets', 'tot_byte_flux', 'flow_duration', 'bit_rate', 'packet_rate', 
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'delta_mean', 'delta_std', 'DPL', 'first_len', 'max_len', 'min_len', 'mean_len', 'byte_std', 
'data_entropy'. The next table  describes each feature: 
Table 14. Used features for each flow as statistical fingerprint 
Features Description 
Num_Pack Number of packets 
Tot_Byte_Flux Number of bytes 
Flow_Duration Duration of the flow in seconds 
Byte_Rate Byte rate 
Packet_Rate Packet rate 
Delta_Mean Average inter-arrival time of packets 
Delta_Std Standard deviation of inter-arrival time 
LE “Entropy” of the packet lengths 
DPL 
Total number of subsets of packets having the 
same length divided by the total number of packets 
of the flow 
First_Len Length of the first packet 
Max_Len Length of the longest packet 
Min_Len Length of the shortest packet 
Mean_Len Average packet length 
Std_Len Standard deviation of the packet length 
 
Using this feature set, the IP network traffic of the PCAP files is converted into a CSV file 
containing group of flows, where the whole network traffic corresponding to the web attacks 
is changed into flows, and each flow is uniquely described by the vector of its features set. The 
vector of features represents  the statistical fingerprint of the flow described in the table above. 
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Using this feature set, the network traffic will be changed into corresponding set flows of flows, 
the next table shows the number of flows for each web attack and each attacking tool. 
Table 15. Changing attack sniffed traffic into the selected feature-set flows 
 
Tool used 
Number of 
attack flows 
per tool 
Total number of 
attack flows per 
attack type 
Brute Force Acunetix 11417 
16616 
Brutus 1094 
Hydra 2405 
Medusa 1500 
Wfuzz 200 
 
Cross site scripting 
 
Acunetix 100 
1942 
Arachni 1175 
WebInspcet 107 
XSSER 560 
Denial of service LOIC 311 
5081 
Pyloris 1000 
Rudy 1420 
SlowLoris 2100 
Torshammer 250 
SQL Injection Acunetix 748 
2391 
Arachni 309 
Jsql 565 
Sqlmap 600 
WebInspect 169 
 
After generating the flows, for SQL Injection, XSS, and brute force attacks, labeling was done 
by checking the packets of each flow, through inspecting the content of the HTTP requests, 
Attack 
Details 
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making sure that the message sent on the application layer, contains an attack. DOS are labeled, 
based on the time when this attack was established, as all the connections where generating 
DOS attacks. Labeling the flows was done using the notation “Web Attack Type: Software 
type”, to identify each flow by its attack type and the attacking tool used to generate this attack. 
9.2.3 Machine Learning Algorithm for Tool Recognition 
Machine learning-based classifiers are aimed to identify to which set of categories a new 
sample belongs on the basis of a training set composed by data whose category is known. 
Machine learning has been used in several research areas to classify, find solutions, recognize 
patterns, etc… Machine learning tools form the basis of anomaly detection systems have 
proven to work with great success. In some cases, classifiers are used to discriminate normal 
from malicious traffic, in other cases to detect the type of the attack. 
Literature proposes plenty of approaches based on the feature set and the eventual training 
algorithms. Most of the existing solutions are computationally demanding and implements 
classification strategies that cannot be interpreted by human users. In this study, we propose 
the use of binary classification trees [78]. This simple algorithm has a lot of advantages with 
respect to more sophisticated strategies: is one of the fastest approach in the literature, requires 
the storage of a very limited number of parameters and actually introduces only one 
hyperparameter, the number of levels. In addition, the computational cost of both the training 
and inference phase are quite limited. Finally, this algorithm is de-facto independent by data 
normalization [79]. This is a major advantage with respect to other algorithms that suffers of 
numerical instability. In addition, the classification procedure is based on a set of thresholds. 
As a major consequence, the prediction process can be the rules employed by the classifier can 
be evaluated by data analyst. 
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This chapter proposes a two-layers classification model to detect the type of the attacking tool. 
Figure 5 shows how the two classification layers are trained independently. Once the final 
models are trained, the incoming data are firstly classified by the “Attack type” classifier. Later, 
for each class of attacks, a specialized classifier “Tool type” assigns the incoming pattern to 
the generating tool. Again should be noted that in the proposed study both attack classifier and 
tool type classifier are implemented by means of classification tree. As a consequence the 
decision rule can be understand by data analysts. 
 
9.3 Experimental section:  
The evaluation of the method’s effectiveness at classifying attack-generation tools covered two 
steps. First, a classifier discriminated the four categories of attacks. This phase is critical in a 
real world scenario, where no prior information is available about the type of the web attack. 
Next, the data split for each category are analyzed independently to recognize the attack-
generating tool. 
Figure 41. Training and testing the two-layers classification for webattacks 
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9.3.1 First classification layer: Attacks Classification 
A tree with a layered hierarchy of threshold-based classifiers supported the recognition of the 
attack types. The dataset was randomly split into a training set including a portion of 70% of 
the available samples, and a test set holding the remaining 30%. To ensure experiment 
repeatability, the parameters were all set to the default values of the scikit-learn python toolbox. 
Table 16 reports on the classification performances measured on the test set, i.e., by classifying 
patterns that had not been used for training. The confusion matrix gives, in each column, the 
actual predictions of the proposed model, and, in each row, the actual labels. Ideally, a perfect 
classifier would attain a diagonal matrix in which predictions and true labels always coincide. 
The results reported refer to a classifier with a maximum depth equal to five, which means that 
the final prediction is obtained controlling five thresholds. 
Table 16. Confusion matrix testing the first classification layer: classifier of Web attack type with max 
depth =5 
Confusion matrix for the first 
classification layer 
Classified as: 
BF XSS DOS SQL injection 
Testing 
attacks 
BF flows 5496 8 0 0 
XSS flows 1 594 0 23 
DOS flows 0 0 1722 0 
SQL injection flows 3 26 1 768 
 
Empirical evidence confirmed that a simple classification rule could anyway yield satisfactory 
performances.  
Table 17 gives the results obtained when using a state-of-the-art classifier model in terms of 
accuracy, i.e., a random forest classifier, which embeds an ensemble of classification trees. The 
number of classification trees was set to 100 by using a subset of training data as a validation 
set. The drawback of any random forest classifier, however, is that it implements a sort of 
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black-box model, as human operators cannot inspect or interpret the actual decision strategy 
easily. Moreover, the computational cost and the number of parameters of Random-Forest 
models grow linearly with the number of trees, hence in this experimental setup the cost was 
100 times larger than that associated with the basic classification tree reported in Table 16. 
Table 17. Confusion matrix testing the first classification layer: classifier of Web attack Attack-type using a baseline 
random forest classifier with n_tree=100 
Confusion matrix for the 
first classification layer 
Classified as: 
BF XSS DOS SQL injection 
Testing 
attacks  
BF flows 5504 0 0 0 
XSS flows 0 613 0 5 
DOS flows 0 0 1721 1 
SQL injection flows 1 24 2 771 
 
The experimental outcomes confirmed that Random Forest did provide a considerable 
improvement in the classification of XSS patterns, as the overall number of errors decreased 
from 23 to 5. At the same time, the difference proved minimal in the other cases.  
In summary, this experimental campaign confirmed that fast and white-box ML algorithms can 
profitably support Web Attacks classification. 
 
9.3.2 Second classification layer: Tool Classification 
 
The upper classification layer aimed to identify the type of software, and a specific classifier 
was built for each flow associated with a category of web attack. In other words, the preliminary 
classification performed by the lower layer determines the type of attack, and for each type of 
attack a specific classifier is built up to identify the generating tool. Therefore, the research 
presented here involved four classifiers.  
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For each attack category, a training set again include a fraction of 70 % of the available attack; 
whereas the remaining data (30%) formed the test set.  
The number of levels in the classification tree was set to 10 as in the previous experimental 
section. Tables 18,19,20,21 report on the measured accuracy in tool classification for the attack 
types SQL Injection, brute force, XSS, and DOS, respectively.  The tables give results in the 
form of confusion matrix. 
Table 18. Confusion matrix testing the classifier used to detect the tool that generate SQL injection attacks 
The Confusion matrix  
Classified as 
Acunetix Arachni JSQL SQLMap WebInspect 
Testing attacks 
generated by 
Acunetix 257 0 0 0 3 
Arachni 0 95 0 1 0 
JSQL 0 0 183 0 1 
SQLMap 0 0 2 198 0 
WebInspect 1 0 0 0 47 
 
 
Table 19. Confusion matrix testing the classifier used to detect the tool used to generate BRUTE FORCE attacks: 
The Confusion matrix 
Classified as 
Acunetix Brutus Hydra Medusa Wfuzz 
Testing attacks 
generated by 
Acunetix 3802 0 0 0 0 
Brutus 0 348 0 0 0 
Hydra 0 0 796 0 0 
Medusa 0 0 1 499 0 
Wfuzz 0 0 0 0 61 
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Table 20 Confusion matrix testing the classifier used to detect the tool that generates XSS attacks: 
The Confusion matrix 
Classified as 
Acunetix Arachni WebInspet XSSER 
Testing attacks 
generated by 
Acunetix 30 1 0 0 
Arachni 0 377 0 0 
WebInspet 0 0 36 3 
XSSER 0 0 0 197 
 
Table 21. Confusion matrix testing the classifier used to detect the tool that generates DOS attacks 
The Confusion matrix 
Classified as 
LOIC Pyloris Rudy Slowloris Torshammer 
Testing attacks 
generated by 
LOIC 116 0 0 0 0 
Pyloris 0 337 0 0 0 
Rudy 1 0 467 0 0 
Slowloris 0 0 0 706 0 
Torshammer 0 0 0 0 78 
9.4 Result analysis: 
When assembling the test results for both the lower-level classifier (attack-type classifier, as 
per Table 17), and the upper level classifier tree (Attacking tool classifier, as per Tables 18-
21), one verifies the effectiveness of the proposed method to recognize both the attack’s type 
and the tool used to generate it. More importantly, the proposed approach stands on a very 
efficient yet interpretable model. As a consequence, analysts and engineers can benefit from 
the resulting approach to evaluate the statistical properties of advanced attacking tool.  
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The chapter considered a collection of the most popular categories of web attacks, generated 
using a variety of tools.  The statistical properties of the gathered data fed white-box machine-
learning models, allowing easy inspection and interpretation by human supervisors. Empirical 
results confirmed that the set of statistical features could support the discrimination of different 
attack schemes and generating tools. In the future, we aim to increase the number of web attacks 
and to create a public repository, available to the research community, to enrich a public dataset 
on a daily basis, through adding web attacks sniffed at the network level. 
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10 Conclusions and future works 
Data must be treated as the core asset of any organization or company, which should be 
protected from all kinds of threats. However, to best protect the data, it is better to adopt a good 
management approach, which minimizes errors, saves time, increases awareness and prepares 
the company to incidents. In information security, taking due care of strategies, setting policies, 
plans, preparing and training staff, and complying to internal or external laws and standards 
should be given the same importance as operating technical tools. The focus should be on both 
organizational and technical sides. Organizations in general including companies should gives 
a great significance to the organizational side of data protection, which is shown by its ISMS 
which was created in accordance with the international standards and frameworks. They should 
also verify that the ISMS is working effectively in the sense that all the defined requirements 
are correctly implemented, and this can be obtained by regular audits to reach continuous 
improvement. This PhD thesis handled the issue of managing data protection, aiming to protect 
the company’s data from both the organizational and the technological side, by implementing 
an Information Security Management System (ISMS), an ISMS consists of the policies, 
procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an 
organization, in the pursuit of protecting its information asset. The goal of ISMS is to minimize 
risk and ensure continuity by pro-actively limiting the impact of a security breach. After that, 
a comprehensive framework is designed for the security risk management of Cyber physical 
systems, this framework represents the strategy used to manage the security risk management, 
and it falls inside the ISMS as a security strategy. In addition, inside the ISMS, another part of 
the work suggested an approach to select an applicable Security Incident and Event 
Management (SIEM) solution, to support companies that are seeking to adopt SIEM systems. 
This approach, unlike others, is customer driven which means that customer needs are taken 
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into account when following the whole approach, specifically when defining the requirements 
and then evaluating the suppliers’ solutions.  
Hitachi Rail STS realizes the necessity to verify that the ISMS is working effectively in the 
sense that all the defined requirements are correctly implemented, and this can be obtained by 
regular audits to reach continuous improvement. Hitachi Rail STS also realizes that not all 
assets are correctly managed, in fact, there are some areas not completely covered such as 
laboratories, plants connections and so on. Therefore, in the future, it is important to extend the 
coverage of the ISMS to these areas and not only to office areas. Also Hitachi Rail STS is 
going to comply with the international standard ISO 27001 on some strategic scopes with the 
aim to obtain a certification, which represents a key goal for the company and its business. 
At the end, a research topic was carried out to detect the type of the webattacks and the tool 
used to generate a web attack. Therefore, a two-layers classification system was designed using 
network statistical fingerprints and machine learning techniques to detect the type of the 
software used by the attackers to generate web attacks, since any information about the 
attackers might be helpful and worth a lot to the cyber security analysts and might aid in the 
prevention and mitigation of web attacks.  
In conclusion, this thesis handled more the one topic that aims to protect data that all falls inside 
the ISMS that has a main goal, which is managing data protection. It deals more with the 
organizational side of data protection, but also it presented at the end an important contribution 
“A two layers classification model” to classify the type and the tool of a web attack, which can 
be placed in the technical side of a risk management strategy and aids in the mitigation of web 
attacks. 
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